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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis considers the nature of power and influence in the U.S.–Ethiopia 
relationship. U.S. government policymakers in Ethiopia should consider the agency of the 
political elite in Ethiopia, as well as the domestic “levers of power” within the Ethiopian 
state. While the chief executive is the critical actor in Ethiopia, he is not immune from 
domestic and international pressures. The United States maintains an active and 
wide-reaching bilateral relationship with the Ethiopian government, its institutions, and 
its people. While American activities in Ethiopia generally contribute toward overall U.S. 
objectives, there are instances where influence does not always adequately consider 
Ethiopian agency and sovereignty. Furthermore, U.S. attempts at influence demonstrate 
varying degrees of effectiveness, but that engagement must expand for the United States 
to remain Ethiopia’s security partner of choice. 
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The cornerstone of American foreign policy in Africa since 9/11 has been in pursuit 
of counterterrorism (CT) objectives. The Horn of Africa is known for weak, corrupt, and 
repressive states. It is also considered fertile for the recruitment of Islamic extremists. 
Ethiopia, despite its own repressive tendencies and geographic proximity to tumultuous 
South Sudan and Somalia, has largely avoided the high-profile terrorist attacks in the 
region and is otherwise considered one of Africa’s strongest states. The United States sees 
the Ethiopian military as a largely competent and capable partner force and supports 
Ethiopian peace-keeping operations in Somalia. However, the age of CT being the primary 
concern of the United States is beginning to pass.  
The United States, as illustrated by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, now 
considers great power competition to be at the heart of its worldwide foreign policy 
objectives.1 African issues are largely omitted in the 2018 National Security Strategy, yet 
China’s expanding investment and influence in the region has prompted concerns of a new 
Cold War in the region.2 During the last Cold War, Ethiopia and Somalia, as American 
and Soviet proxies, respectively, fought a bloody war with over 30,000 casualties.3 While 
the United States currently enjoys a favorable relationship with the Ethiopian government, 
increased Chinese assistance offers a viable alternative that could undermine American 
bilateral efforts. Is the United States successfully manipulating levers of power in Ethiopia 
to achieve its foreign policy objectives? This thesis evaluates the ways that the United 
States can achieve its foreign policy objectives, both in Ethiopia and the region, while 
Ethiopia’s own geopolitical and economic realities shift under new domestic and 
international pressures. 
 
                                                 
1 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” n.d., 2. 
2 Zachary Karabell, “A Cold War Is Coming, and It Isn’t China’s Fault,” Foreign Policy, accessed 
February 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/31/a-cold-war-is-coming-and-it-isnt-chinas-fault/. 
3 Gebru Tareke, “The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,” The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000): 665, https://doi.org/10.2307/3097438. 
2 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Though the questions of U.S. aid effectiveness in Africa and the utility of security 
cooperation efforts have been studied, no academic literature has specifically addressed the 
ways that the United States aims its efforts in Ethiopia. As the United States shifts toward 
strategy for great power competition, a greater understanding of the opportunities and 
constraints for U.S. influence would increase the efficiency of future cooperation, thus 
improving the relationship while delivering benefits to the Ethiopians themselves. 
Furthermore, though the U.S.–Ethiopian relationship is unique, there are wider lessons 
about American influence in Africa as China and other global actors step-up their own 
attempts at influence.  
One of these broader questions concerns U.S. relationships with repressive 
authoritarian regimes in Africa and elsewhere. Backlash from Jamal Khashoggi’s alleged 
murder has shown that both domestic and international groups grow increasingly critical 
of U.S.’ support for authoritarian regimes, though pragmatic geopolitical considerations 
win out under the current administration.4 Critics of the Ethiopian state, which is frequently 
condemned for repressive tendencies, have previously called for limits on U.S. security 
assistance and aid.5 Though the U.S. government (U.S.G.) has largely ignored criticism in 
both instances, questions of future cooperation linger. Thus, this research also speaks to 
the delicate balance of advancing security objectives in states known for authoritarian 
practices.  
Aside from its practical applications, this thesis also enhances theoretical 
knowledge about great power influence in the developing world. Comparing the effects of 
U.S. and Chinese influence attempts in Ethiopia, where the latter are especially active, 
contributes to an understanding of international competition in Africa, and more broadly 
                                                 
4 Darlene Superville, “Trump Puts Saudi Arms Sales above Inquiry into Khashoggi Killing,” PBS 
NewsHour, June 24, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trump-puts-saudi-arms-sales-above-
inquiry-into-khashoggi-killing. 
5 Terrence Lyons, “Diaspora Lobbying and Ethiopian Politics,” in Diaspora Lobbies and the US 
Government: Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy, n.d., 166. 
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in the developing world. In comparing the methods and efficacy of both great powers’ 
influence, we can learn which strategies succeed and which ones fail.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis evaluates the relationship between the United States and Ethiopia in an 
effort to see where U.S. policy is most likely to be successful and where it is least valuable. 
The secondary purpose of this thesis is to contrast U.S. efforts with those of China. In both 
cases, the effort analyzes how distinct policies are able to improve a state’s influence over 
another sovereign country. Thus, the theoretical concepts of influence and power must be 
considered.  
In this section, I begin by reviewing some of the main concepts related to 
international power and influence. I will then introduce mechanisms of influence derived 
from social psychology literature that can be useful to assess United States or Chinese 
influence in Ethiopia. Next, I will discuss the importance of understanding African agency 
through the lens of internal actors and aid structures. In the final section of the literature 
review, I discuss the steady and deliberate nature of U.S. foreign policy for Africa.  
1. Defining Power and Influence 
Realist international relations theory proposes that human nature is at the core of 
international politics. Morgenthau asserts that states are rational actors that pursue policies 
in their interest.6 He claims that historical evidence demonstrates that states (and their 
leaders) have and will pursue power.7 Morgenthau’s explanation of power implies that 
there is a distinction between “those who exercise [power] and those over whom it is 
exercised.”8 He also suggests that influence is different than power, in that power includes 
means to force another to comply.9 In contrast, Morgenthau considers influence as the 
                                                 
6 Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton, Politics among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006), 5. 
7 Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, 5. 
8 Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, 28. 
9 Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, 29. 
4 
ability to persuade rather than compel. To Morgenthau, political power only exists before 
violence takes place. Certainly, he acknowledges that the threat of violence is a key aspect 
of politics, but once a state crosses the threshold into physical violence the nature of the 
interaction has morphed from political to military or pseudo-military.10 In the context of 
the U.S.–Ethiopia relationship, both influence and power, as conceived by Morgenthau, 
are desirable outcomes for the United States.  
Both people and states exercise power and exert influence in different ways. 
Morgenthau famously conceptualizes the most commonly accepted form of power, hard 
power. He argues that in “international politics in particular, armed strength as a threat or 
a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a 
nation.”11 Crucially, hard power is not only the maintenance of a large or well-equipped 
military. Rather, hard power includes the capacity to sustain that military power, which 
usually requires a strong natural resource base, and capitalization of human capital, 
advanced technology, and other material wealth. Though this is clearly an important 
element when studying international relations, there are other compelling arguments.  
Nye revolutionized scholarship by creating a new term: “Soft Power.” His 
metaphor for power is a case of tools, and from this perspective, the tools that do not require 
force are soft power. These tools include business partnerships, targeted news efforts, 
including public diplomacy, and cultural exchanges. Nye also suggests that “soft power is 
the ability to get what you want through attraction.”12 As Nye admits, governments may 
not be able to control the exact nature of culturally based soft power, but they can make 
more targeted efforts to exert soft power.13 In Ethiopia, the United States can pursue 
policies that involve either hard or soft power. However, Nye’s conclusions suggest that 
overusing hard power runs the risk of alienating the Ethiopian state and its people. While 
                                                 
10 Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, 29. 
11 Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, 29. 
12 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 
(June 2004): 256, https://doi.org/10.2307/20202345. 
13 Nye, 266. 
5 
hard power may benefit the United States in certain short-run situations, perceptions of the 
United States and its government also matter.  
Though theoretically ambiguous, states can employ influence activities that do not 
neatly conform to hard or soft power. One such activity that is particularly popular with 
the current administration is economic sanctions. As well as the proverbial stick, powers 
can offer carrots in this economic realm. The United States and China heavily invest in the 
Ethiopian state, albeit through very different methods. In Africa generally, the United 
States typically works through official development assistance (ODA), while China tends 
to work through loans. Though observers criticize both methods, the extent and scale of 
China’s loans worry many. Rosen observes that Grant Harris, an Obama era White House 
official, characterizes Chinese debt as “methamphetamines of infrastructure finance… 
highly addictive, readily available, and with long-term negative effects that far outweigh 
any temporary high.”14  
Security cooperation, another type of influence activity cannot be easily categorized 
as hard or soft power. Though generally military in nature, security cooperation in Africa 
tends to focus on developing partner capacity, including developmental assistance to 
improve the health and professional development of African forces.  
2. Social Psychology of Influence and Power 
Morgenthau and Nye are primarily concerned with the political dimensions of 
influence. Morgenthau attempts to clarify the underlying political factors in keeping, 
increasing, and gaining power. Nye seeks to expose his audience to a new understanding 
of power that does not involve the threat or use of force. However, approaching the topics 
from a social psychology perspective can clarify and disentangle some of approaches to 
influence. Social psychology further explains influence in another context, one that can be 
useful in Political Science. Building on French and Raven’s 1959 groundbreaking social 
                                                 
14 Jonathan Rosen, “‘China Must Be Stopped’: Zambia Debates the Threat of ‘Debt-Trap’ Diplomacy,” 




psychology work, Raven further developed the most prominent model of power, 
interaction, and influence in 1965. This model is useful in exploring U.S. influence in 
Ethiopia. 
Raven suggests that there are six key “bases of power.” They are: informational 
(not included on original list), reward, coercion, legitimate, expertise, and referent.15 These 
bases of power include both hard and soft power. Similar to Nye’s recommendation that 
states employ a mixture of hard and soft power, Raven suggests that different situations 
and challenges require different bases of power.16 Furthermore, though these bases of 
power seem permanent, the relationship between the influencer and influenced is complex 
and variable, therefore the methods of influence should reflect these changes.  
I will briefly identify the key aspects of each base of power, as this theoretical 
framework will be used to analyze existing U.S. policies in Ethiopia. For clarity and 
consistency with Raven, I will henceforth use the terms “influencing agent” (IA) and 
“target” to describe the bases of power. Reward power is a transactional relationship where 
the IA offers a benefit to the target in order to reward compliance. Conversely, coercive 
power involves the threat of punishment for noncompliance. As Raven highlights, both 
coercive and reward power require surveillance, meaning that each power base is of limited 
value unless the IA can monitor whether the target is complying. The concept of 
surveillance between two sovereign states is particularly difficult, especially in scenarios 
of coercive power, as the target is motivated to obfuscate noncompliance.  
The following bases of power do not require surveillance: legitimate, expert and 
referent. Legitimate power causes the target to comply because they feel they “should,” 
and because the target sees the IA as valid and justified in their request. Expert power 
occurs when the target believes the IA knows more and therefore the target should comply. 
Informational Power sees the IA persuading, without threat or offer of reward, the target 
                                                 
15 Bertram H. Raven, “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal 
Influence: Bases of Power,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 8, no. 1 (September 15, 2008): 1, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2008.00159.x. 
16 Joseph S. Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (August 
2009): 161. 
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to change its course of action. Finally, referent power exists when the target emulates the 
IA because of the influencer’s attractiveness, and therefore complies. That these types of 
power do not require surveillance is both importance in theory but also in practice. Of 
particular concern for the study of the U.S.–Ethiopia relationship is that the United States 
may not be able to guarantee continued access to information on the progress or results of 
its efforts, especially any information that the Ethiopian state deems counterproductive. 
Thus, though there is no assurance of success, it might be preferable for the United States 
to pursue strategies that favor legitimate, expert, or referent power. Many of the elements 
of these methods, particularly those that require the target to respect the IA, evoke Nye. 
Nye mentions style, in the context of soft power, as the outward image of cooperation  
and mutual respect.17 Morgenthau also considers that the impact of political power is 
contingent on, among other things, “the respect or love for men or institutions.”18 Thus, 
both social psychology and international relations can prescribe actions that will yield the 
best results.  
Influence between the IA and target does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, these 
attempts occur as part of a larger interaction between the two actors. Raven suggests that 
the likelihood of success varies considerably, often because of previous influence 
attempts.19 Ultimately, the choice of influence style will and should be case dependent and 
should assume that both the IA and the target have learned from previous experiences and 
probably changed. Acknowledging that the target wields power is in essence granting it 
agency. The following section will consider some of the unique aspects of African agency. 
3. Agency and Structure 
When considering the relationship between a hegemon and a relatively weaker state 
many are tempted to ignore the agency of the weaker party. The agency of African states 
                                                 
17 Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 268. 
18 Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, Politics among Nations, 28. 
19 Raven, “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence,” 9. 
8 
is considered weak, largely because of high dependency on foreign aid.20 Fisher, while 
addressing both international structure and agency, compels scholars to reconsider the 
conventional wisdom that discounts African agency. Similar to Brown, he suggests that 
sovereignty plays a constitutive role in the interplay between Western aid agencies and 
their intended African recipient states.21 Savvy aid recipients, such as Ethiopia, have 
lobbied in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere to rally support for the causes that will accrue 
aid.22 According to Fisher, this is prime evidence of “African states securing agency in the 
international system.”23 Thus, understanding who makes decisions in the Ethiopian 
government and why is a critical aspect of U.S. influence. Moreover, Brown and Fisher 
suggest that ignoring agency imperils the accuracy of academic work and its practical  
by-products. In this work on Ethiopia, this means we should understand that Ethiopia’s 
own interests and actions drive its own reactions, both at home and in the broader 
international system. 
Some academics have started to recognize the benefits of considering African 
agency. However, according to Fisher, even the few scholars who recognize African 
agency tend to contradict those principles in their works.24 He suggests that ignoring 
African agency is logical, because so many African states have relied “heavily upon loans 
and grants from Western donors to fund their budgets and upon training and support from 
Western militaries and defence departments to equip and train their security personnel.”25 
Nonetheless, studies that downplay the importance of African agency can miss important 
domestic and international dynamics. This thesis considers target-country interests and 
actions as a key determinant of foreign policy success.  
                                                 
20 Jonathan Fisher, “Structure, Agency and Africa in the International System: Donor Diplomacy and 
Regional Security Policy in East Africa since the 1990s,” Conflict, Security & Development 13, no. 5 
(December 2013): 538, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.849471. 
21 William Brown, “Sovereignty Matters: Africa, Donors, and the Aid Relationship,” African Affairs 
112, no. 447 (April 1, 2013): 281–82, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt001. 
22 Fisher, “Structure, Agency and Africa in the International System,” 544. 
23 Fisher, 544. 
24 Fisher, 540. 
25 Fisher, 541. 
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Fisher contends that confusion about agency and structure largely exists because  
of the complex and crowded nature of both internal and external stakeholders. Thus, 
internal dynamics are frequently overlooked. Therefore, this thesis takes seriously the 
internal mechanisms of the Ethiopian state. Certainly, the main actors are easily 
identifiable, especially in states like Ethiopia, where the party and chief executive are 
supreme. If the actors are the “who,” then the structure is the “why.” The international 
structure, particularly concerning aid, displays a complex and often opaque dynamic. 
Fisher highlights decisions where donations are made as evidence that the international 
system is not “clear-cut.”26 Though donor country hesitation to discuss full rationale for 
choices is part of the problem, much confusion occurs because African states themselves 
have had an impact on the system.  
4. U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory in Africa 
The majority of the following thesis concerns U.S. attempts at influence in 
Ethiopia; thus, it is valuable to consider literature examining the broad contours of U.S.–
Africa policy post-independence. Peter Schraeder has devoted considerable effort to 
tracking the history of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa since World War II. According to 
him, there are two key elements of the U.S.’ approach to Africa: low-prioritization and 
bureaucratic incrementalism. This section will briefly outline the evidence for both and 
propose how these characteristics could specifically affect the U.S.–Ethiopia relationship. 
Schraeder and Rothchild both suggest that for the United States, Africa has been a 
low priority.27 American interest in Africa decreased with the end of the Cold War.28 
Rothchild suggests that a major reason for this organizational disinterest in Africa stems 
from an uninformed and largely unconcerned American public.29 Even during the Cold 
                                                 
26 Fisher, 543. 
27 Donald S. Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 
205, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2001.0021; Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward 
Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change, Reprinted 1996, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 
31 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), 49. 
28 Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” 179. 
29 Rothchild, 179. 
10 
War, the United States preferred to expend effort in a few areas in order to limit Soviet 
influence in the region. When possible, the United States abdicated authority in the region, 
suggesting that former colonial powers take the lead role in those nations.30 When U.S. 
presidents did consider issues in Africa, it was not because the region itself was important, 
but rather because it was a new battlefront between the U.S. and USSR. A statement from 
the Kennedy administration best exemplifies this position: “We see Africa as probably the 
greatest open field of maneuver in the worldwide competition between the [communist] 
bloc and the non-communist world.”31 However, while this assertion suggests proactive 
U.S. involvement throughout the region, what actually occurred was reactionary U.S. 
engagement after the USSR involved itself on the continent.32  
U.S. disinterest and limited engagement during the Cold War was followed by 
considerable disengagement in the 1990s, precipitated by U.S. military casualties in 
Somalia. Even before the October 3, 1993, battle in Mogadishu, American public opinion 
did not support wide military objectives in Somalia. After the battle, opposition to U.S. 
military involvement increased, with 64 percent of respondents to a Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research survey urging that U.S. troops be withdrawn.33 The post-Somalia 
era saw the United States “sidelined” in conflicts throughout the region, from Rwanda to 
Sudan.34 The above developments suggest that the United States is unlikely to favor 
influence efforts that require significant military operations involving  U.S. forces, other 
than when absolutely necessary. That the executive branch of the American government 
fails to prioritize Africa changes the bilateral relationship. Generally, it reinforces an 
incrementalistic approach. It also changes which U.S. bureaucratic organization 
participates and how. 
                                                 
30 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 15. 
31 Schraeder, 15. 
32 Schraeder, 15. 
33 Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” 190. 
34 Rothchild, 192. 
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Schraeder suggests that bureaucratic politics best exemplifies the majority of U.S. 
foreign policy in Africa. Multiple U.S. stakeholder organizations each bring their own 
practices and mission objectives to the table in Africa. These organizations include the 
Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and the executive branch. Each stakeholder has slightly different objectives, 
and these have varied alongside geopolitical shifts worldwide, including the end of the 
Cold War. These organizations’ different objectives and capabilities mean that they each 
approach a given challenge with a different strategy. These strategies work to achieve the 
overall U.S. foreign policy goal while also highlighting their organization’s unique 
capabilities. Dedicated support to preserving an organization’s core-mission underlies the 
principles of bureaucratic politics.35  
Bureaucratic incrementalism also influences the U.S.–Ethiopia relationship. 
According to Rothchild the bureaucratic nature of the relationship favors “low-cost and 
low-risk” involvement. This bureaucratic “incrementalism,” as Schraeder describes it, 
implies a slow but steady progression of policies. Absent the most extreme influence from 
the executive branch, programs in Africa are therefore likely to continue amidst changes 
in administrations, even if overall strategies change. Therefore, in studying the bilateral 
relationship between the United States and Ethiopia, I will focus on those programs with a 
long history, as they are most likely to continue in the future, no matter the presidential 
administration. Rothchild suggests that pursuing a directive or invasive activist policy, one 
that seeks to radically and rapidly change the fundamental structure of the target state could 
threaten “Africa’s desire for autonomy and self-reliance.”36 Activities in Africa must be 
justifiable to U.S. leadership and the American taxpayer. 
                                                 
35 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), 26. 
36 Rothchild, 206. 
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C. ANALYTIC APPROACH 
Analyzing U.S.G. efforts at influencing Ethiopia to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives is a complex undertaking. Therefore, this thesis utilizes an analytic approach 
which breaks the core question down into more manageable components.  
1. State Interests 
Every state’s internal conditions and regional context affects how it behaves 
domestically and internationally. Though external pressures can modify a state’s  
interest, those interests are not identical. Ethiopia’s dedication to sovereignty could mean 
that all external pressure will be considered skeptically and pragmatically. To understand 
how Ethiopia’s interests are modified by external factors we must first identify what its 
interests are. 
2. Levers of Power 
Governments are not unitary. Distinct actors within a government and its 
population work to achieve their own objectives within the state. The actors’ importance 
within a state vary by issue. Any external actor, such as the United States or China, must 
understand which actors are useful to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Therefore, 
this thesis analyzes the domestic structure and levers of power in Ethiopia. This allows an 
academic analysis of current influence activities and provides practitioners an opportunity 
to analyze whether future influence activities are likely to yield successful results.  
3. Influence Activities 
The United States and China both hope to influence Ethiopia, and they have many 
influence activities and power mechanisms to help achieve their foreign policy objectives. 
To assess their relative impact, we must first identify which activities are taking place. 
Levers of power are still important in this discussion because a foreign government’s 
influence activities may be misdirected towards a lever of power that has no clout to modify 
general state behavior.  
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4. Influence Analysis 
Influence activities do not occur within a vacuum. Activities which are potent in 
one state may be ineffective in another. This occurs primarily as a result of the target state’s 
interests. Furthermore, influence activities might even appear successful, but not work to 
alter the target state’s behavior. Therefore, I consider the impacts of influence activities in 
Ethiopia and address whether influence activities have advanced either American or 
Chinese foreign policy goals.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis focuses on the period from 1991 until the present. The Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) assumed the central role in the 
Ethiopian government after a successful rebellion concluding in 1991.37 In Ethiopia, the 
party is the state and vice versa. Thus, when considering the internal mechanics of the 
Ethiopian government, this thesis focuses on developments since 1991. This will isolate 
developments within the EPRDF and omit former regimes such as the Derg. As the 
literature suggests, the U.S. relationship with Ethiopia rapidly improved and changed 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For consistency, this thesis considers 
U.S.–Ethiopian relations since 1991, despite most significant bilateral developments 
occurring since 2001.  
Ethiopia’s significant strategic location and unique imperial history make the state 
an intriguing subject. However, a long history of authoritarian repression and a notorious 
tight-hold on communications make studying Ethiopia challenging. For example, no single 
work analyzes the constraints on executive power in Ethiopia. The majority of the data 
analyzing the limits of executive authority in Ethiopia is therefore derived from of books 
and academic journal articles. Analyzing the results of both United States and Chinese 
influence actions also require articles from academic journals, think tank studies, and 
domestic and international news. U.S. policy priorities are not explicitly delineated; 
however certain public records indicate the broad outlines of the U.S.–Ethiopian 
                                                 
37 Terrence Lyons, “The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian 
Politics,” n.d., 174. 
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relationship. The testimony of U.S. Ambassador-designees tends to condense the main 
stated objectives of the bilateral relationship.38 Admittedly, this testimony only provides a 
snapshot in time; yet, if several concurrent testimonies are studied, we begin to see trends. 
This analysis also requires quantitative data from think-tank reports and some data from 
the organizations themselves (e.g., PEPFAR reports). United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) data on development aid helps assess absolute 
amounts of aid and where this aid is directed, both in terms of types of projects and amounts 
committed and distributed.39 Other institutional studies provide invaluable data; for 
instance the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) data on arms 
transfers is comprehensive and reliable.40 Independent think tanks mitigate the existing 
bias of using official data from U.S.G. organizations. Nonetheless, in many cases the 
U.S.G. data is the most applicable and likely the most accurate, or the only data available. 
I will be especially cautious when considering information such as “perceptions of the 
U.S.G. because of program X.” In these cases, I will explicitly highlight the limitations 
(and potential bias) of these data. 
During this research I also conducted interviews with the former U.S. Senior 
Defense Official and Defense Attaché to Ethiopia, who was responsible for security 
cooperation with Ethiopia. The interviews provided information on the “what” of U.S. 
security programs in Ethiopia.41 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The next chapter, “Levers of Power,” identifies the structure and vulnerabilities of 
the government of Ethiopia. By identifying the possible “levers of power,” I am able to 
                                                 
38 Donald E. Booth, “Statement of Donald E Booth Nominee to Be U.S. Ambassador to the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee” (2009); Patricia M. 
Haslach, “Statement of Patricia M. Haslach Nominee to Be U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee” (2013); Michael Raynor, “Statement 
of Michael Arthur Raynor Nominee to Be U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee” (2017). 
39 “FAE: Data Query,” accessed February 21, 2019, https://explorer.usaid.gov//query. 
40 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database | SIPRI,” accessed February 21, 2019, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
41 Per Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board determination #2019.0074-DD-N 
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assess if the U.S.G. successfully targets vulnerabilities (soft spots). I highlight sectors of 
the government that are particularly immune to outside influence, because targeting these 
areas would be unlikely to be successful.  
The third chapter, “U.S. Pursuit of Influence in Ethiopia,” begins by identifying the 
main goals of U.S. foreign policy in Ethiopia. It also highlights the “best case scenario” for 
the U.S.G. in Ethiopia. Furthermore, this chapter determines the main U.S. efforts in the 
country, showing what specific actions the U.S.G. is taking. Finally, this chapter evaluates 
whether these specific actions are successful. Success will mean effectiveness at that 
specific action, but also must mean working toward the overall “best case scenario” for 
U.S.–Ethiopian relations.  
The fourth chapter, “Chinese influence in Ethiopia,” contrasts the efforts of the 
United States with the influence actions taken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
It considers the potential benefits for Chinese cooperation with Ethiopia, for both parties. 
Furthermore, this chapter analyzes the Chinese government’s attempts to expand its 
portfolio of influence activities, specifically into sectors typically associated with the West. 
I also consider the challenges China faces in their most active influence activities.  
Finally, the conclusion addresses the overall trends based on the information from 
both the United States and the PRC. To focus this comparison, the conclusion addresses 
which state better achieves their goals, and which strategies are best aligned with the 
vulnerable levers of power identified in Chapter II. This conclusion also identifies possible 
areas for future study. 
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II. LEVERS OF POWER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers the structure and nature of government and other political 
entities in Ethiopia. After an overview of Ethiopia’s basic political system, I analyze its 
domestic “levers of power.” To be considered an effective lever of power, these groups or 
individuals must be able to shape or constrain executive policies or actions. As with many 
of its African neighbors, Ethiopia’s chief executive is the single most important lever of 
power. However, other groups and institutions have and will continue to shape Ethiopia’s 
political future. 
While Ethiopia’s Prime Minister (PM) is indeed the state’s most important actor, 
his political party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has 
been a dominant force on the political scene. The military is closely tied to the EPRDF and 
to the executive, and maintains significant authority in the state, though recent reforms 
have threatened that branch’s political salience. Outside of the government, civil society 
protests have demonstrated the largest check on executive autonomy. Typically, the 
protests have occurred around parliamentary elections, despite the elections themselves 
being little more than a rubber stamp for continued autocratic governance.  
This chapter addresses the first two components of my analytical approach to the 
overall research. In service of component one, this chapter considers Ethiopia’s state 
interests. More broadly, this chapter also focuses on component two, levers of power. 
Ethiopia’s domestic mechanics are more complicated than the African strongman trope 
where state decisions only enrich the political elite. For the United States and China, 
understanding that these are not the only levers of power within Ethiopia is necessary to 
better achieve their foreign policy goals. The Ethiopian state is at a point of significant 
change, and reforms may decentralize power, making other levers of power more 
influential than they have been for the last two decades. Therefore, identifying the levers 
of power and assessing their relative strength is practically and academically important.  
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1. Basic Political Overview and Government Structure 
According to its 1995 constitution, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s 
government is specifically responsible for national defense, interactions with foreign 
governments, and “general policy of common interest and benefits.”42 This last 
responsibility is vague and allows the central government considerable leeway in pursuing 
many economic and social policies. The government is parliamentary and is divided among 
nine member states, which are organized ethnically.  
2. Structure of Politics in Ethiopia 
Politics in Ethiopia have centered on a dominant coalition of parties created by  
a successful military revolution that overthrew the unpopular Communist Derg43 in 1991. 
The name of this coalition of parties is the EPRDF. The EPRDF, though technically 
inclusive of other ethnic parties that united against the Derg has mostly been known for  
its Tigrayan faction, the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). The EPRDF pursued 
a system of Ethnic Federalism that accentuated ethnic divisions in Ethiopia, offering a 
counter to what they saw as previous Amharic domination. The EPRDF’s pursuit of  
Ethnic Federalism permeated all elements of government and was enshrined in a 1995 
constitution. 
3. Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian government is designated a Federal Democratic Republic. Ethiopia 
is split into nine ethnically defined states, creating its ethnic federalist structure.44 Ethnic 
federalism is worth special consideration because it is an extremely rare political system, 
and it is critical to the distribution of power within Ethiopia. The ethnic federal system 
formalizes territorial and ethnic divisions within the country, which often coincide with 
political divisions. Opinions of the system vary, with many outside observers asserting that 
                                                 
42 “Government Structure—Ethiopia,” Ethiopian Government, n.d., 
http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/government-structure. 
43 Derg is Amharic for committee, and the government was known for a strong central committee 
44 “Government Structure—Ethiopia.” 
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the system is dangerous in its “politicization” of the many ethnic divisions present in the 
state. Ethnic federalism in the Ethiopian context means that ethnically defined regions are 
allowed “self-determination” up to the point of secession. Theoretically, ethnic federalism 
assigns a great deal of power to regional governments, but in practice the trend has been 
toward increased centralization of power in the hands of the EPRDF.45 In and of itself the 
system of ethnic federalism is not a lever of power, yet it underscores the structure and 
interactions within the government.  
4. The EPRDF 
The EPRDF is the core element of the Ethiopian government. The party came to 
power following a successful military insurgency and rebellion against the Communist 
Derg government in 1991.46 It inherited an entrenched authoritarian state, and all its 
trappings.47 The EPRDF is a strong lever of power in the Ethiopian state. The EPRDF is 
somewhat unique in its organization, as it is comprised of four constituent parties, 
reflecting some of the major ethnic groups. The TPLF, during conflict with the Derg, 
expanded from their own structure to incorporate their allies amongst different ethnic 
groups. These core four groups (now political parties) were incorporated incrementally, 
starting in 1989 and concluding in 1994.48 
The four parties are: 
The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—This party is the remnants of the 
core revolutionary group that opposed the Derg government. Prime Minister (PM) Meles 
Zenawi, Ethiopian PM from 1995–2015 (his death), headed this party as well as the larger 
EPRDF.  
                                                 
45 Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000, 
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47 Vaughan and Tronvoll, 25. 
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The Oromo Democratic Party (ODP)—This party represents Ethiopia’s largest 
ethnic group, the Oromos. Formerly called the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization 
(OPDO), it is headed by PM Abiy Ahmed. This party also has origins from the 
revolutionary struggle but was less represented in government following the revolution.49 
The Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM)—A political 
party connected to the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR). 
The region and political party are ethnically diverse and were headed by former PM 
Hailemariam Desalegn from 2002–2018. The SEPDM is currently headed by Muferiat 
Kamil. She has previously served in government as Minister for Women’s Affairs under 
PM Meles Zenawi.50 
Amhara Democratic Party (ADP—Political party connected to the Amhara Region. 
They are formerly known as the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM).51 The 
Amharic people historically ruled the Ethiopian Empire, despite only being a quarter of the 
total population.52 Nonetheless, this group’s historical supremacy makes it an important 
element of the overall EPRDF. 
The strength of the individual parties that make up the EPRDF has varied over time. 
This indicates that no single individual or party is the central power and demonstrates the 
flexibility and resilience of the overall EPRDF. PM Abiy Ahmed’s appointment has 
increased the tensions between the ODP, of which he is a member, and the TPLF, which 
feels threatened by government reforms. The TPLF’s plans to depart the EPRDF will be 
discussed in a later section.  
                                                 
49 “Oromo People’s Democratic Organization - About Us,” Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, 
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5. Party Structure/Mechanics 
Figure 1 indicates the party structure and format for the selection or election of 
committees and councils. Currently, the most influential of these bodies are the party 
central committees and the EPRDF Executive Committee. These councils inform state 
decisions as well as drafting, amending and adopting constitutions.53 Put simply, no 
important federal decision could be made without the approval of either the executive or 
one of these councils. To illustrate the importance of the above, current Prime Minister 
Abiy was elected as chairperson of the OPD by his OPD central committee.54 Thereafter, 
he was elected by the EPRDF council, where tacit TPLF support55 elevated him compared 
to opponents from the other constituent parties.56 The composition and balance of these 
groups has remained fairly constant. 
 
Figure 1. EPRDF Congress and Committee Structure57 
                                                 
53 “Government Structure—Ethiopia.” 
54 “Ethiopia: Dr. Abiy Ahmed tipped to become next PM,” Journal du Cameroun (blog), February 23, 
2018, https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/ethiopia-dr-abiy-ahmed-tipped-to-become-next-pm/. 
55 The TPLF did not nominate a candidate for PM, thus making the competition between 3 candidates, 
with the TPLF bloc able to cast the deciding votes 
56 “Ethiopia,” February 23, 2018. 
57 Source: Sisay Zedagim, “EPRDF’s Leadership Structure and Election | Metekakat Review,” Horn 
Affairs, April 5, 2013, https://hornaffairs.com/2013/04/05/ethiopia-eprdf-leadership-organs-election/. 
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6. History of EPRDF and Ideology 
The EPRDF’s dominant nature vis-à-vis political opposition is the main feature of 
the political landscape in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the structure of the EPRDF and its main 
constituent parties showcases the strengths and potential weaknesses of their brand of party 
control. The TPLF is the earliest and historically most important constituent group of the 
EPRDF. They formed in 1975 as a group of student movements originating at Addis Ababa 
University.58 The TPLF originated as a means to secure an independent Tigray, the 
northern area of Ethiopia along the modern border with Eritrea. As the TPLF gained 
momentum it shifted and widened its political efforts.59 Rather than pursuing separation, 
the TPLF seemed determined to restructure the Ethiopian state and allow greater 
representation of the Tigrayan in central government. This front was not the only resistance 
movement of its kind in Tigray, but it was best able to coopt or out-maneuver its 
revolutionary rivals. The TPLF originally espoused Marxist-Leninist ideology but have 
since adapted to support policies generally considered left of center.60 The party has shown 
remarkable tenacity against political opposition, and though we see ideological flexibility, 
economic development has been the constant raison-d’etre for the party.  
7. Fissures within the EPRDF—Ethiopian Eritrean War 
Dynamics within the EPRDF and its constituent parties pose a threat to the long-
term longevity of the EPRDF as ruling party. The most notable historical evidence of this 
occurred following the conclusion of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War between 1998 and 2000. 
In 2001, the TPLF core faction of the EPRDF was divided with regard to terms for ending 
the war. These deeply contested divisions caused significant fallout between members, 
compelling some TPLF dissenters to sit-out some Central Committee meetings. Doing so 
was disastrous for their individual political futures, as they were subsequently expelled 
from the party entirely.61 This exclusion on its own was significant, but also prompted the 
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EPRDF to purge those sympathetic to the dissenters. The leaders of the OPDO and the 
SEPDF were subsequently ousted. Furthermore, thousands of party cadre were ousted.62 
These extreme actions, though perhaps necessary to maintain power, weakened the TPLF 
and exposed cracks in the previously invulnerable faction of the EPRDF. Meanwhile, this 
event also shows that the EPRDF had started to develop an identity of its own, independent 
of its TPLF roots. Vaughn and Tronvoll note that the ouster “resulted in the alienation of 
some parts of the Tigrayan constituency, although most seem to have resigned themselves 
to the existing situation.”63 While this division highlighted weakness, the party did not 
crumble, and in subsequent years went on to consolidate its position across broad swaths 
of society. This historical event is important because it sets the context for the current 
divisions within the EPRDF, revolving around PM Abiy’s reforms. 
8. Current Political In-fighting and Future of EPRDF 
The EPRDF is likely to maintain its grip on power through the next election cycle, 
whether the elections are free and fair or as flawed as in previous instances. Though they 
are likely to remain in power, the EPRDF stands to lose significant ground because of two 
recent and related developments. First, and most importantly, is the threat of the TPLF to 
leave the EPRDF.64 Jane’s Information Group assesses that the TPLF is likely to depart 
the EPRDF before the scheduled 2020 parliamentary elections.65 The main reason they 
plan to leave is because PM Abiy plans to reorganize the EPRDF into one single party, 
rather than as an alliance of four. This action is bold, and potentially weakens the EPRDF’s 
position vis-à-vis political opposition. Nonetheless, the choice is logical, as one aim of 
restructuring the EPRDF is to provide more equitable political power to other ethnic 
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groups, notably the Oromos, thereby addressing some of the political inequities that have 
caused popular unrest.   
The EPRDF is a durable and powerful institution in Ethiopia. In the near-term the 
party and the PM will remain the primary actor in domestic affairs. While intra-party 
divisions should be carefully assessed, the adaptive nature of the EPRDF, and its 
demonstrated ability to tackle new challenges will make it the central element of the 
Ethiopian government for the near future.  
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH—PM AND PRESIDENT 
The PM, by being connected at deep levels with the party’s congress, is the ultimate 
authority in Ethiopia. As noted, the current PM is Abiy Ahmed, who assumed his 
responsibilities on the April 2, 2018.66 Abiy Ahmed is an active reformist. Notably he is 
the first Oromo leader, and his appointment came at a time when the Oromo region was 
the heart of anti-government chaos.67 Aside from serving as PM, he is also the head of the 
Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), one of the other constituent parties 
that make up the EPRDF. Prior to becoming PM, Abiy was a senior military intelligence 
figure, he even participated in the revolutionary struggle against the Derg. Though PMs are 
nominated by EPRDF central committees, there are very few checks on their authority, 
both within the party and from external actors. The PM is technically elected by the House 
of Representatives; however, as further sections will show, the legislature is ineffective 
and is a lightly veiled extension of the EPRDF. The PM is the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces and also appoints ministers for the rest of government.68  
A head of state exists in the form of the president. The current president is Sahle-
Work Zewde, Ethiopia’s first female president. She is a seasoned diplomat, with experience 
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in regional and international organizations.69 Nonetheless, presidents in Ethiopia are 
figureheads who have very little responsibility for governance, and are constitutionally 
subservient to PMs.70 Due to practical limitations in the current structure of government, 
President Zewde is not a significant lever of power. Put simply, since 1991, the PM has 
been the most important lever of power in the Ethiopian state. PMs owe their legitimacy to 
the political establishment but have considerable freedom of action and maneuver in all 
aspects of government. 
C. LEGISLATURE AND JUDICIARY 
1. Legislature 
The Ethiopian parliament is bicameral, with its lower house (House of People’s 
Representatives) directly elected by the population and its upper house (House of 
Federation) indirectly elected by state assemblies. In terms of responsibility, the lower 
house passes legislation while the upper house deals with federal issues and interprets the 
constitution.71 Both chambers are also technically responsible for electing both the 
president and the PM. However, the legislature, because of a history of electoral 
intimidation and dissent of political opposition has merely acted as a rubber stamp of 
approval for choices of the EPRDF’s central committees. 
Furthermore, consideration of the status quo for election management in Ethiopia 
exposes how the legislature fails to restrict executive authority. Parliament could be a more 
effective curb on EPRDF ambitions, but only after free elections and other state elements 
are reformed to discard biased appointments. 
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2. Judiciary  
Local judicial systems in Ethiopia vary slightly by region, though they largely 
mirror the federal system. The federal judicial branch consists of the Federal Supreme 
Court, federal high courts and federal courts of first instance (district courts).72 The Federal 
Supreme Court is chaired by a president and vice president, both of whom are 
recommended by the PM and approved by the House of People’s Representatives.  
The Ethiopian judiciary is not a lever of power, as it is currently an extension of the 
ERPDF power structure. Even a cursory analysis of the above judicial structure establishes 
how the EPRDF could manipulate the system to ensure party loyalty. Fiseha best explains 
the limits of the judiciary: “Ethiopia’s judiciary has never had a separate institutional 
existence distinct from the executive. Since the time of the Emperor, then under the Derg, 
and now in current Federal Ethiopia, each government has set up its own version of the 
judiciary to suit its own purpose.”73  
Constitutionally the judiciary is granted limited powers. However, there are two 
main problems. First, the constitution is typically applied selectively by the EPRDF, 
especially those rules that concern the separation of powers.74 Second, and most 
surprisingly, the Ethiopian Constitution does not establish judicial constitutional review. 
Strikingly, this places Ethiopia alongside Cuba, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.75 Instead, it 
vests these powers in the House of Federation, which, as previously discussed, are elected 
in an unfree way.  
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D. ELECTIONS AND OPPOSITION PARTIES 
General elections in Ethiopia elect members for the lower house of parliament, the 
House of People’s Representatives.76 Though I have previously highlighted the limitations 
of parliament, poor performance at the polls would signal EPRDF weakness and could 
undermine their policies and legitimacy. While the legislature itself is not a lever of power, 
parliamentary elections accomplish more than filling those legislative seats: they can act 
as a scorecard for the government. Furthermore, elections are symbolically important, and 
globally visible. Protests in Ethiopia have often occurred shortly before or immediately 
after legislative elections. Thus, free and fair elections can be a lever of power in the 
Ethiopian state. While the majority of elections during the EPRDF’s tenure have been 
electorally questionable, those elections where the regime has allowed genuine political 
opposition have threatened their hegemony. Likewise, political opposition parties are 
unlikely to win at the ballot box, but through protest and violent demonstrations are able 
to alter government policies. No single political opposition party has been best suited to 
challenge the EPRDF. 
1. Opposition Parties 
As of November 2017, there were a staggering 81 opposition parties listed in 
Ethiopia.77 This can be partially attributed to several factors. First, the system of ethno-
federalism and the salience of ethnic identities and languages constrains transmission 
challenges, such as language. Furthermore, the long and repressive history of the EPRDF 
has created a plethora of disenfranchised groups. The government does not typically 
prevent the formation of new political parties, but occasionally uses Anti-Terrorism laws 
to censor their members or otherwise delegitimize them.78 Thus party formation is 
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relatively open, but the threat of government harassment has been a hallmark of the EPRDF 
government. 
The greatest electoral threat to the EPRDF is from any coalition that could garner 
wide enough support to capture constituencies in several regions. The Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) is the most recent group to attempt such a move. It 
incorporates a variety of Ethiopian nationalist parties as well as some regional parties.79 
However, unless a significant faction of the EPRDF, such as the TPLF, defects to such a 
coalition, these coalitions are unlikely to unseat the EPRDF. 
Elections 
In many states, elections offer the people an opportunity to provide feedback to the 
sitting government or to press political leaders to take a state in a new direction. However, 
in other states elections are little more than affirmation of loyalty to long-seated autocrats. 
Alternatively, even if elections do not provide a realistic opportunity to unseat an 
incumbent, they act as a sort of governmental report card and can compel authoritarian 
regimes to change course. Holding elections, even when they are “choice-free” can benefit 
the most authoritarian states. Geddes et al. argue that elections can serve several purposes 
for an autocratic regime. Elections can inform the central party of local surrogate 
effectiveness, it can help assess the popularity of specific policies, and it can spur intraparty 
competition.80 In Ethiopia, only the 2005 election posed a legitimate threat to EPRDF 
hegemony. However, the 2020 parliamentary election stands to also challenge the EPRDF.  
Some elections in Ethiopia are little more than an opportunity for the EPRDF to 
reassure Western donor communities while maintaining a tight grip on control of the 
political sphere. Aalen and Tronvoll suggest that “Ethiopia is seen as a case which 
demonstrates how elections can be instruments of political control rather than devices of 
liberalisation.”81 Certainly there has been variation and evolution in the conduct of, and 
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reactions to, elections and opposition parties by the ruling EPRDF. However, broadly 
speaking, the trend since 1991 has been of the party apparatus consolidating power and 
minimizing electoral opposition. Aalen and Tronvoll split the period since 1991 into two 
sections: pre and post the Ethiopian-Eritrean War.  
According to Aalen and Tronvoll, the general trend from 1991 until 2000 was the 
EPRDF allowing elections but carefully controlling their process and their results. Early 
elections reflected popular approval of the victorious rebel movement, while also 
demonstrating the extent that ordinary citizens disdained the brutally repressive Derg. 
Abbink suggests that “there is no doubt that post-1991 Ethiopia saw significant political 
institution building and that a public ethos of democracy emerged.”82 However, he 
concludes that the dedication to democracy was a case of “rhetoric not backed by 
practice.”83 To secure favorable results, the party intimidated ‘hostile’ voters while 
simultaneously eroding the capabilities and outreach of opposition parties.84  
Before the 2005 parliamentary elections the EPRDF deliberately chose to allow the 
formation and space for political opposition. However, they never directly engaged with 
these opposition parties in debate, instead choosing to appear “above the fray.” The 
abundance of political parties ensured enough in-fighting within the opposition that no 
single party ever posed a significant threat to the EPRDF. Aalen and Tronvoll argue that 
“liberalization ahead of the 2005 elections would not entail any real challenge to its 
position, but instead had calculated that it could keep control in its own hands at the same 
time as profiting from an enhanced democratic image.”85 No matter the rationale, the 
prospects of a free and fair election in 2005 set the stage for interesting political dynamics. 
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2. 2005 Parliamentary Elections 
The 2005 elections, and the state’s apparent liberalization, were seen as an 
opportunity for true democratic change. Abbink notes that “the Ethiopian parliamentary 
elections of May 2005 were the most contested ever.”86 As other sections of this thesis 
will highlight, diverse groups regarded the 2005 elections as a rare opportunity to voice 
dissent or contribute to the social or economic development in Ethiopia. Aalen and 
Tronvoll outline the widespread optimism about the 2005 elections: 
The positive conduct of campaigns and polling initially indicated that a 
fundamental change was taking place in Ethiopian political culture, because 
apparently there was a new acceptance for displaying public political 
dissent—an observation that led some scholars to label the elections as 
“founding,” “formative” and “genuine” for true democracy in Ethiopia.87  
Abbink argues that the 2005 elections, despite initial optimism, were not the 
beginning of a shift in EPRDF conduct.88 He further cites an empirical analysis that 
confirms that the electoral process was indeed an improvement, but was largely 
undermined by “some serious flaws, especially in the counting stage, [that] probably did 
not reflect the preference of the people under free-and-fair conditions.”89 Aalen and 
Tronvoll are even more critical of the elections, calling them “a liberalisation intermezzo 
in EPRDF’s continuous efforts to stay in power.”90 
Considering the political patterns of the EPRDF, regime turnover was impossible. 
Nonetheless, a strong electoral result could have compelled the regime to offer concessions 
to the parties that performed best. Indeed, the elections did compel the EPRDF to revitalize 
its efforts in many rural areas. Aalen and Tronvoll suggest that by grasping the obvious 
arguments of electoral fraud we might discount the significant efforts the EPRDF takes to 
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build grassroots support.91 They argue that EPRDF investment in the “kebeles,” or 
neighborhood administrations, was the key to success as the ballot-box during a 2005 
parliamentary election.92  
3. EPRDF Lessons Learned from the 2005 Parliamentary Election 
The conduct of the EPRDF in the run-up, and immediately after the 2005 elections 
suggest a miscalculation of popular discontent.93 The state encouraged participation and 
liberalization without honestly considering the possibility that the will of the people was 
divergent from their own aspirations. However, the 2005 elections also demonstrate that 
the EPRDF was competent enough to read the writing on the wall that it was beginning to 
lose support from former strongholds. Aalen and Tronvoll cite an interview with a member 
of the TPLF to suggest that the party knew as early as one month prior to the election that 
they had lost support in rural areas.94 The election also shows that the EPRDF was able to 
rapidly mobilize its base to dramatic effect. Aalen and Tronvoll note “the possible rigging 
of the count is not the major reason for the maintenance of EPRDF hegemony. The ruling 
party’s network of control through local administrative structures enabled it to pressurise 
many rural voters who make up 85 per cent of the Ethiopian population, to vote for it.”95 
Therefore, the party was able to work quickly to minimize potential damage from an 
invigorated political opposition. Aalen and Tronvoll are even more adamant about the 
results of political exclusion: “the current closure of space in the country may thus have a 
severely destabilising effect in the long run, and may ultimately challenge EPRDF’s ability 
to remain in power.”96 
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4. Post-2005 Elections—Looking at the 2020 Elections 
If the 2005 parliamentary elections were a wake-up call, it was one that was 
received clearly by the EPRDF. In the near-term it is unlikely that the EPRDF will 
completely forget the disastrous results of liberalizing elections. Abbink notes that the 
possibility of re-democratization is not impossible, but increasingly unlikely.97 However, 
he also concludes that “most observers… have now come to conclude that, in simple 
objective terms, the position of the incumbent government is seriously weakened despite 
its re-establishing some kind of order. There is no going back to things as they were before 
May 2005.”98 These conclusions are complicated by PM Abiy’s political reforms 
(discussed below). Currently, it seems likely that the EPRDF will allow the same kind of 
electoral openness that occurred immediately preceding the 2005 elections. This will 
happen not because the party has forgotten, but because the regime has staked itself on its 
reform ideology.  
E. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Protest in Ethiopia is a significant lever of power in Ethiopia. To best demonstrate 
the nature of this phenomenon I will consider recent Ethiopian protests that have altered 
national policies and still color political and ideological dialogue.  
1. 2015–2018 Protests in Oromia 
Oromia is the region home to Ethiopia’s ethnic majority, the Oromos.99 
Throughout the majority of modern Ethiopian history, this ethnic group has been politically 
excluded from national politics. Though the exact origin of recent protests in the region is 
unclear, most analysts point to a combination of low-simmering grievances that finally 
erupted after the central government proposed an expansion of Addis Ababa’s city limits, 
at the expense of Oromo farmers. This economic grievance rapidly mutated to include more 
political demands, which were met by heavy-handed state repression. Other reasons for the 
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protest were maltreatment of ethnic Oromos by the security services and the police, 
economic disenfranchisement of the Oromo people, and government corruption.100 By all 
accounts the protests were widespread, with some commentators even arguing that they 
became a “popular revolt.”101 The protests eventually spread from the Oromo region to 
the Amhara region, which is home to Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic group.  
These demonstrations challenged the EPRDF’s authority, which contributed to a 
vicious cycle of greater repression and increased protests. Generally, the strong-armed 
policies of the central government sparked a legitimate political and security crisis in 
Ethiopia’s most populated region. Allo also argued that these protests were unique because 
for the first time the two largest Ethiopian ethnic groups, the Oromos and the Amharas, 
united against the central government.102  
The Party’s response was swift and brutal. The EPRDF initially cracked down 
against protesters as it had done in response to protests during the 2005 parliamentary 
elections. However, the widespread and continued nature of these protests eventually 
prompted a crisis within the EPRDF. When regime survival came into question, it became 
clear that drastic reforms needed to be offered to assuage the displeased protesters. PM 
Hailemaream Desaleagn, who replaced longtime leader Meles Zenawi after his death, was 
forced to resign as a result of the protests. PM Abiy’s appointment placated most protesters. 
2. Implications for the Ethiopian Government 
The threat of future protests is a strong influence for PM Abiy to continue with his 
commitment to reforms. While the current political discourse is nowhere near its apex of 
2015 to 2018, the base issues remain unresolved. Therefore, political protests are likely to 
return and expand if reforms fail to be implemented adequately. An aggravated Tigray 
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could be home to future protests, if the TPLF does indeed depart the EPRDF. However, 
protests are unlikely to be successful unless groups can band together like the Oromos and 
Amharas did between 2015 and 2018.  
F. MILITARY/SECURITY FORCES 
The military in Ethiopia is a significant lever of power. Typically, the PM and the 
EPRDF central committees have been composed by former military members, especially 
in the transformative period immediately following the 1991 revolution. Though the 
importance of the revolutionary cadre is sure to wane as time goes on, the military has 
enshrined itself in the Ethiopian political scene. Current PM Abiy Ahmed, though too 
young to have substantially participated in the revolution, owes much of his current 
political success to his military career.103 Abiy spent his formative years in the military 
institution, in varied capacities. However, the military’s repressive tendencies flamed the 
ethnic tensions that threatened the regime’s survival between 2015 and 2018. In response, 
Abiy began to institute reforms that restrained the security services while simultaneously 
freeing political prisoners. Thus, politically, PM Abiy has developed a complex 
relationship with the military establishment. The effect of Abiy’s reform efforts on the 
military’s political engagement are likely to be apparent before the 2020 parliamentary 
elections. 
1. Historical Significance 
The military is traditionally an important faction within the EPRDF. This 
importance has varied since PM Meles’ 2012 death. The military as an institution is being 
restrained, mostly because of association with the repression in popular protests in 2016. 
Terrence Lyons, who studies the political outcome of post-war states, argues that 
successful rebel movements, especially from protracted rebellions, breed successful 
political parties. Lyons argues that this phenomenon occurs for two main reasons. First, the 
cohesion built by military experience is durable, and it can hold together a political party 
                                                 
103 “The Rise of Abiy ‘Abiyot’ Ahmed | The Reporter Ethiopia English,” The Reporter Ethiopia, n.d., 
http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/rise-abiy-abiyot-ahmed. 
35 
long after the insurgency itself. Lyons contends that “wartime conditions encouraged the 
development of cohesive leadership and models of administration of liberated territory that 
created models for managing relations with civilian populations.”104 Second, a successful 
insurgency provides the subsequent political party a strongly perceived position of 
legitimacy.105  
The long counter-insurgency against the Derg from 1974 to 1991 provided 
combined military and political experience for the EPRDF.106 The party employed 
political cadre within its military units to both maintain control and reinforce ideological 
backing.107 The military, which originated as a largely ethnically Tigrayan entity, adjusted 
to the EPRDF’s model of Ethnic-Federalism by reducing its proportion of ethnic Tigrayans. 
Nonetheless, the Tigrayan veterans of the revolutionary struggle filled the majority of the 
influential positions in the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF).  
2. Current Composition and Roles 
Unlike many militaries in the region, the ENDF maintains a strong capacity for 
countering external threats. Participation in regional peacekeeping efforts likely satisfy 
Ethiopian desires for a professionally developed and established military as well as 
securing Ethiopia’s “neighborhood.” Jane’s Information Group specifically notes the 
ENDF’s “considerable battlefield experience and reputation for toughness.”108 The ENDF 
is a primarily land-focused force, though thawing relations with Eritrea has opened up the 
possibility of the reemergence of an Ethiopian Navy.109 Though the rapprochement with 
Eritrea has reduced the threat of interstate conflict, estimates from Jane’s Defence Budgets 
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office suggests a continued level of funding for the foreseeable future.110 This apparent 
level of funding is notable, when one considers the budgetary fallout of the 2000 peace 
agreement with Eritrea. In the decade following that agreement Ethiopian defense spending 
was reduced by approximately 50%.111 Why the Ethiopian government maintaining its 
defense budget despite the detente with Eritrea (their largest security threat) is unclear, 
though it could be a means to placate political unrest from military elite.  
Senior ranks in the ENDF are typically skewed to ethnic Tigrayans, which matched 
the political representation of the EPRDF following the military revolution that ended in 
1991. PM Abiy’s reforms have altered the composition of senior ranks of the ENDF, 
mostly to the benefit of ethnic Oromos.112 The reforms in the military sector have thus far 
focused on reducing corruption while balancing the ethnic composition of the overall 
forces. The decision to “de-ethnicize” lower ranking positions is counter to the “ethnic 
stacking” practiced by many other African states. Harkness suggests that so called ethnic 
stacking is a significant impediment to democratization. Therefore, because the Ethiopian 
state has deliberately avoided ethnic stacking, it is less likely to experience a successful 
coup d’état.113 Furthermore, this decision improved the diversity and recruiting 
possibilities for the ENDF. Though these reforms are unlikely to drastically reduce overall 
military capacity, they have prompted response from the disaffected groups (discussed 
below).  
3. Current Challenges Because of the Military 
Recent ethnic protests have deteriorated the popular perception of the military and 
highlight the dangers of brutal military repression. Ethiopian protests form a sort of vicious 
cycle, as the more protests occur, the more repression is required to maintain control. 
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Recent developments in Ethiopia suggest that the executive is more powerful than the 
military authority. As part of PM Abiy’s reform actions, he has ordered the arrest of over 
sixty defense officials.114 While many have been accused of corruption, AP reporting 
suggests that others were arrested for the brutal tactics the military used against 
protesters.115 This crackdown demonstrates that the PM is able to maintain the loyalty of 
his top generals while managing the reforms necessary for the state apparatus to exist. Not 
all elements of the military institution have been as easy to reform. 
In October of 2018 more than 200 soldiers marched to the PM’s office demanding 
to be heard.116 Though their supposed grievances included wages and military 
organizations, most commentators argue that the main reason for this mutinous action was 
related to the substantial military reforms that PM Abiy has undertaken. Jane’s argues that 
the mutiny “indicate [s] deterioration in the rank-and-file’s observances of the ENDF’s 
chain of command, as the soldiers appealed directly to the prime minister over their 
grievances, rather than through official channels.”117 PM Abiy’s commitment to reforming 
the military institution, despite the obvious threat to his personal political future, aims to 
accomplish two goals. First, the PM hopes to reign in the military whose repressive actions 
eroded popular support for the EPRDF. Second, it supports his efforts to reinvigorate the 
ethnic Oromos segment of the military institution. Ultimately, this shows that even if PM 
Abiy is able to reorganize the upper echelons of the military, lower-ranking members still 
pose a political (or even security) threat to the executive.  
                                                 
114 Elias Meseret, “Ethiopia Arrests 63 Suspected of Rights Abuses, Corruption,” AP NEWS, 
November 12, 2018, https://apnews.com/09863def4f734e79bbecc6b3b09c8202. 
115 “Ethiopia Arrests Ex-Head of Army Firm in Crackdown on Security...,” Reuters, November 13, 
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics-idUSKCN1NI1AN. 
116 “Short-Lived Mutiny Indicates Deteriorating Ethiopian Military Chain of Command, but Ruling 
Coalition Will Likely Remain in Power,” Jane’s IHS, n.d., 
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1156193-JIWK. 
117 “Short-Lived Mutiny Indicates Deteriorating Ethiopian Military Chain of Command, but Ruling 
Coalition Will Likely Remain in Power.” 
38 
4. What to Expect in the Future 
Individual aspects of the military institution and the powerful former military 
faction of the EPRDF are complex. Some aspects suggest that the state apparatus has 
benefited from a proud military tradition. However, the further we get from 1991, the less 
influential the TPLF military bloc will be in the political affairs of Ethiopia. Despite 
reforms, former revolutionary fighters still comprise the top echelons of the military 
establishment. As long as this is the case, the executive is somewhat threatened by the 
military institution. PM Abiy’s military heritage is emblematic of the military bloc’s 
power, even if the military itself may be vulnerable to reform. I suspect that minor events 
such as the 2018 mutiny will continue, especially if PM Abiy continues his reform efforts. 
Just as the military has an effect on politics, political maneuvering is likely to affect the 
military. If PM Abiy continues to disenfranchise the TPLF faction in the run-up to the 2020 
elections it may further strain the relationship between the executive and military 
leadership, though this frustration is unlikely to boil over into a true coup-d’état.118 
Though not a coup of the central government, a June 2019 regional coup highlights 
the fragile relationship between the military and the ethno-federal political system. In this 
regional coup, the Amhara’s regional president was killed by a militia allegedly loyal to 
the region’s former security chief, who was recently released from prison as a part of PM 
Abiy’s political reforms.119 The regional coup underscores the important role that the 
military plays in Ethiopian politics but also demonstrates that ethnic identity, which was a 
key rationale for the coup, is a significant source of insecurity in Ethiopia. The 
disenfranchised military factions that have lost out as a result of Abiy’s reforms find 
themselves in an interesting position. Clearly, some have chosen violent action to protest 
what they see as injustice. Paradoxically, these coups and limited mutinies reinforce the 
PM’s position that the military must be reformed. The Ethiopian Army is traditionally the 
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most important branch, due to the nature of conflict in the region. Ethiopia’s general 
officers, especially those with revolutionary roots are the most influential group within the 
military.  
G. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
The Ethiopian economy is remarkably strong, especially considering its regional 
context. The World Bank suggests the Ethiopian economy’s growth was nearly double that 
of the regional average.120 Furthermore, the Ethiopian economy is diverse. However, 
despite consistent growth, much of the Ethiopian population remains in poverty.121 World 
Bank figures estimate GDP at $783 per capita.122  
The Ethiopian economy’s strength is evidence that state-directed development can 
quickly transform a state. However remarkable that growth has been, PM Abiy and others 
have decided that the public-sector focused development must transition to the private 
sector.123 This privatization could make Ethiopia more globally competitive and relieve 
the pressure of limited foreign exchange reserves.124 Generally the Ethiopian economy is 
split between agriculture (35%), industry (25%), and services (40%).125 Ethiopia’s focus 
on infrastructure projects, mostly funded by external debt, has created a shift away from 
agriculture.  
The Ethiopian state derives power from its capacity to provide economic 
development. This singular focus on development, and the formidable results displayed, 
allows the executive branch unusual leeway in domestic affairs. Nonetheless, the state 
understands that to achieve its lofty economic goals it must enlist support, both 
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domestically and externally. Therefore, economic entities other than the central 
government, such as outside investors and international organizations that coordinate 
development efforts do exercise influence on the executive and the EPRDF. PM Abiy 
specifically acknowledges the role of economic success to subdue divisive political 
tensions that could be the greatest threat to regime survival: “When you grow, you don’t 
have time for these communal issues.”126  
1. Historical State Actions 
To accomplish economic development all previous post-1991 regimes pursued 
specific programs to increase prosperity for its core constituency, the rural poor. Recent 
actions by PM Abiy suggests a new economic focus on the disaffected urban populations, 
which were the heart of the anti-government protests that forced previous PM Hailemariam 
Desaleagn’s resignation.127 Notable prior government plans include the 2006 Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) and the 2010 Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP).128 The government is currently on its second iteration of 
the GTP, GTPII. Though perhaps overly optimistic, results have been noteworthy. Pilling 
and Barber argue that “for nearly 15 years, the economy had been growing at more than 10 
percent annually, according to official statistics. Even if overstated, growth has propelled 
a nation long associated with famine from an $8bn minnow at the turn of the century to an 
$80bn economy that has surpassed Kenya as the biggest in east Africa.”129 Though the 
state certainly made significant economic strides in the last two decades, many observers 
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contend that PM Abiy faces an uphill challenge to keep the Ethiopian economy 
growing.130  
2. Likely Future Actions/Problems 
Though growing the economy is a challenge that requires both domestic and 
external support, the EPRDF is the gatekeeper who coordinates all efforts. The process was 
more directly controlled and focused on the public sector during PM Meles Zenawi’s 
tenure.131 By privatizing some sectors, PM Abiy hopes to regain the substantial economic 
momentum of the past two decades. However, he does not discard all state intervention in 
the economic process: “The economy will grow naturally, but you have to lead it in a 
guided manner.”132 In practical terms, this is manifested by the PM leading delegations 
around the world to court international investment and reduce fiscal burdens.133 Abiy has 
been active with European partners, but has also recently attempted to attract investment 
from Gulf and Middle East states.134 In March 2019, the French government pledged 100 
million Euros to improve Ethiopia’s economic foothold, meanwhile several French 
companies, including shipper CMA-CGM, telecom giant Orange, and agri-food group 
Soufflet have either signed or agreed on deals.135 What makes all of these discussions 
possible is PM Abiy’s reformist discourse. French President Emmanuel Macron best 
describes this sentiment: “We are here in a friendly country where we want to strengthen 
and build a new page in our common history…Since you became prime minister our vision 
[of Ethiopia] has profoundly changed.”136   
Though PM Abiy has gone far and wide to garner support is notable, the most 
important single state for Ethiopia’s economic prospects is China. Between 2006 and 2015 
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Chinese entities loaned over 13 billion dollars.137 In fact, PM Abiy’s impetus to court non-
Chinese investors may be because of “Beijing’s waning enthusiasm for the region’s fastest-
growing economy.”138 According to Aglionby and Feng, the reason for Chinese reticence 
is mostly economic, both an acute concern for dwindling foreign exchange reserves and 
Ethiopia’s debt distress, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has labeled as 
“high.”139 
3. Overall Considerations 
International economic actors are unlikely to challenge the EPRDF or executive for 
mainly economic reasons. Primarily, the status quo of a strong central state has managed 
to protect foreign investments from the turmoil that is endemic to the region. Nonetheless, 
the EPRDF has pinned its success on maintaining the steady economic growth that was 
common for the last 15 years. Therefore, the executive will be likely to keep historically 
profitable sectors of the economy booming while still searching for external investors to 
expand future growth opportunities. Domestic industry, in particular the construction 
sector, has been a key element of economic growth. Thus, this sector is likely to be favored 
and have a greater capability to exert influence over the executive. Though the state has a 
robust economic team that makes policy, the executive has acted and is likely to continue 
to act as the central decision-making node. 
H. THE ETHIOPIAN DIASPORA 
The scale of the Ethiopian diaspora in the United States is immense. Lyons 
estimates that there are 73,000 Ethiopian-born residents living around the United States.140 
When one includes U.S.-born children of these Ethiopian-born residents, the diaspora 
population rises to almost 500,000.141 The diaspora is a pervasive player on the political 
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sphere in Ethiopia. Many of the characteristics that propelled many Ethiopians to leave 
also makes them more likely to attempt to influence domestic Ethiopian politics. However, 
in their current form they are unlikely to strongly affect executive or EPRDF use of power.  
Certainly with a group this large there is considerable variation in political 
participation and political goals. Lyons concedes that “most diaspora organizations and 
media focus on cultural, professional, and economic self-help initiatives rather than 
partisan politics.”142 To Lyons and Sheffer, that the majority of the Ethiopian diaspora is 
“conflict-generated” is a critical distinction.143 To Lyons “conflict-generated” means the 
groups are “characterized by traumatic memories and important symbolic ties to the 
homeland.”144 According to Lyons, the effect of this heritage is an all-or-nothing hard line 
approach. When politically active, the Ethiopian diaspora employs a variety of tactics to 
achieve its goals. The challenge for such a large diaspora community is developing a 
cohesive set of goals, a factor complicated by Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic composition. 
During the run-up and aftermath of the 2005 contested parliamentary elections the 
role of the diaspora was accentuated. In this period, the diaspora acted as a conduit for 
activities that ordinary Ethiopians could not achieve. For instance, the diaspora raised 
funds, hosted political debates, provided forums for party building, participated in policy 
discussions with U.S.G. funded think-tanks, and even directly lobbied the U.S.G. The 
results of all these efforts have been limited, particularly when the diaspora tries to affect 
U.S. policy, especially after the brutal crackdown following the 2005 elections. Lyons 
succinctly notes that “opportunities for the diaspora to influence politics in Ethiopia by 
lobbying the U.S.G. or by directly engaging in politics as it did in 2005 have closed.”145 
Their other efforts, such as fund raising and an avenue for political discussion, is the 
diaspora’s greatest opportunity. 
                                                 
142 Lyons, 167. 
143 Gabriel Sheffer, “The Effects of Diasporas’ Nature, Types, and Goals on Hostland Foreign 
Policies,” in Diaspora Lobbies and the US Government: Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign 
Policy, n.d.; Lyons, “Diaspora Lobbying and Ethiopian Politics.” 
144 Lyons, 164. 
145 Lyons, 179–80. 
44 
The Ethiopian government has an office specifically concerned with diaspora 
affairs, which demonstrates the state’s understanding of their potential importance. 
Nonetheless, present decision making is seldom influenced by diaspora opinions. One area 
for future attention is the potential for the diaspora’s influence to magnify in the run-up to 
the scheduled 2020 parliamentary elections.  
I. MEDIA 
The media is not currently a lever of power that can constrain executive or EPRDF 
political supremacy. Though some of the factors that support this conclusion relate to 
deliberate actions by the ruling party, some other factors relate to the cultural limitations 
and institutional dynamics such as limited funding, education, and access for independent 
journalists. Overall, harsh repression of critical voices and slanted “development 
journalism” characterized the EPRDF media approach for almost thirty years. Now, new 
voices for reform are being given an opportunity to thrive, in no small part, as an effort to 
attract international investment and improve the lives of ordinary Ethiopians. While media 
currently does not act as a “Fourth Estate” that constrains executive power in Ethiopia, 
empowered independent journalists could start to change the status quo. These voices will 
have to contend with a culture of respect for authority, limited resources, access, and reach. 
1. Structure of the Press in Ethiopia 
A central factor to the ineffectiveness of Ethiopian media, whether public or 
private, is the literacy rate: 36%.146 There are seven newspapers in Ethiopia, two of which 
are state-owned.147 Newspaper readership is estimated at an abysmal .465%, and much of 
that is concentrated in the capital, Addis Ababa.148 Internet penetration stands somewhat 
better, at 15.4%, but as shown below there are severe restrictions on critical information 
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passing through that medium.149 Radio and television are therefore the most important 
media platforms. As of September 2018, there are four television stations, one of which is 
state-owned. There are five main radio stations, most of which are connected either 
officially or unofficially to the state media apparatus.150 Unfortunately no data exists on 
viewership or listenership totals.  
2. EPRDF Media Policy 
The EPRDF employs multiple tactics to shape the media sphere in Ethiopia. By 
maintaining a monopoly on power in the country since 1991 the EPRDF has enjoyed free 
reign to develop a state media that is tightly controlled by the party while creating 
conditions inhospitable for critical media actors to engage.  
There are three main themes of EPRDF public media policy. First, the state attempts 
to monopolize communications to its core constituency: the rural masses. These efforts 
focus on the radio medium. Second, the state attempts to improve elements of professional 
public journalism only in areas where this professionalism will not erode support or expose 
government shortcomings. Third, the state uses legal mechanisms to constrain critical 
private journalism. 
The first strategy, motivating the masses, remains critical to government 
communications policy. Likewise, the EPRDF still considers radio an essential medium to 
stay relevant to its mainly rural constituency. Other than Radio Ethiopia, the state 
broadcaster, the EPRDF manages several radio stations through their affiliate organizations 
in the respective regions.151 The state is unflinching in its quest to dominate the radio 
medium. It grants licenses sparingly, and even then, favors companies that employ 
journalists with pro-government stances.152 The EPRDF also cracked down on many 
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forms of critical media. One of the stations targeted was the U.S.G.-funded Voice of 
America (VoA) Amharic language station. According to Reuters its services were jammed 
for at least three weeks.153 Despite these efforts, Stremlau argues that “international 
broadcasters such as [VOA] from the United States and Germany’s Deutsche Welle remain 
major competitors, despite attempts to curtail reception.”154 Dugo suggests that because 
the state is able to effectively jam the well-resourced VoA services we should understand 
the regime is even better suited to block poorly-resourced domestic stations.155 Altogether, 
the EPRDF considers competition radio stations a significant threat, and state radio stations 
as their main connection to the citizenry. 
The second strategy focuses on public print media, which directly targets the 
political elite.156 The tenor of public media in Ethiopia is best described as “development 
journalism.” This means that the regime hopes to frame state journalism in terms of 
economic development. Skjerdal suggests that in Ethiopian development journalism “the 
journalist is seen as an active change agent, rather than as a passive reporter. The aim is to 
bring about ‘rapid national change’. In stimulating development, the journalist is requested 
to focus on positive success stories. Critical coverage is less emphasized.”157 The state’s 
application of this policy creates a barrier for professional state journalists. In addition, it 
deteriorates the critical thinking abilities of the Ethiopian population.  
The third strategy of the Ethiopian state to control the official narrative is through 
repression and intimidation. Though the Ethiopian constitution promises freedom of the 
press, this has never been realized. Especially following the reality check of an 
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unexpectedly contested 2005 parliamentary election, the Ethiopian government tightened 
its legal framework to repress dissent in the media. Two main legal frameworks have been 
most exploited to restrict critical press. The first is a 2005 criminal code that specifies 
restrictions on communication deemed “obscene,” even including criticism of government 
officials.158 The second framework is a 2009 antiterrorism law. The above laws allowed 
the state an unprecedented freedom of action to restrict critical journalism. The laws allow 
state surveillance of media and opposition, prohibits Skype and other Voice over Internet 
Protocol systems, and denies citizens and organizations the ability to circumvent the state-
owned and operated telecommunication service Ethio Telecom.  
Laws and taxation have also allowed the state to eliminate all but the state-managed 
printing press, the Berhanena Selam Printing Press. This forces publishers to relinquish 
their works to state review. Therefore, the state retains the capability to directly censor 
critical works. The most criticized application of these new laws is the state’s detention of 
journalists. The 2017 Freedom House Freedom of the Press report notes that Ethiopia is 
the “fifth-worst jailer of journalists in the world and the second worst in sub-Saharan 
Africa.”159 
New media is also restricted. In 2006 the regime blocked several websites and even 
entirely blocked cellular short message service (SMS).160 The regime has continued this 
practice during popular protests as recently as February 2018. A part of what allows the 
regime to pursue these controversial measures is the implicit cooperation from their 
technology partners.161 
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3. Organizational and Economic Limitations 
Organizational and economic factors also contribute to an unmotivated and 
uncritical Ethiopian media. Dirbaba and O’Donnell highlight a “lack of newsroom 
resources, controls imposed by media managers and editors, unhelpful editorial policies 
and work procedures, censorship, and poor pay and conditions.”162 Some of these 
dynamics exist absent government interference, but they support government objectives of 
curbed criticism. Low pay and poor working conditions further reduce incentives for a 
robust media system. This dynamic is especially true for jobs in independent media, where 
a greater personal risk is compounded by low financial and professional rewards. A 
Freedom House Report on Internet Freedom suggests that economic challenges limit the 
viability of independent online media. They suggest that “fear of government pressure 
dissuades local businesses from advertising with politically critical websites.”163  
4. What to Expect in the Future 
All eyes should be on Ethiopian media in the run-up and during the 2020 
parliamentary elections. PM Abiy Ahmed, a noted reformist, has called for and 
implemented drastic reforms, especially with regard to the imprisonment and torture of 
journalists. A CNN report claims that Ethiopia no longer has any journalists in prison, a 
stark contrast to the situation in 2016.164 This change is promising for the future of the 
journalistic profession and for improved access to reliable information for Ethiopian 
citizens. The real test of Ethiopia’s new-found commitment to an open media will be how 
freely licenses for radio are distributed. Based on similar relaxations of controls on  
internet blogging I suspect that the state will slowly accept outside voices over Ethiopian 
airwaves. The press is unlikely to act as a lever of power toward executive power in the 
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near future, though overall political reform efforts by PM Abiy may increase its importance 
in the long term. 
J. CONCLUSIONS 
Ethiopia, as demonstrated by the unprecedented rapid appointment of PM Abiy, is 
at a political crossroads. Though the government is large and well connected with most 
elements of Ethiopian society, the very political reforms necessary to ensure regime 
survival have caused deep divisions within the once-invulnerable EPRDF. Institutional 
inertia will still favor the status quo of a powerful executive and wide-reaching political 
power. Nonetheless, the military elite, with their close revolutionary ties to the EPRDF, 
will continue to exert influence on the PM.  
Outside of the government, upcoming 2020 parliamentary elections will be a true 
test of PM Abiy’s control of the government. Though favorable results for the EPRDF are 
all but guaranteed, there is a significant chance of a resurgence of popular protest if ethnic 
groups perceive their relevance fading. Critical voices already question the long- term 
feasibility of Ethiopia’s brand of Ethnic Federalism. The subtle progress made toward an 
independent media and revitalized political opposition could be eliminated if PM Abiy 
senses serious party vulnerability. In all likelihood, despite mounting ethnic tensions and 
occasional violent outbursts, the EPRDF will weather this storm as it has numerous others 
during its almost 30-year history. 
This domestic context indicates that the United States and China should anticipate 
a potential decentralization of power in accordance with PM Abiy’s reforms. This 
decentralization presents challenges and opportunities. China’s focus on the executive has 
yet to limit its influence effectiveness, but failure to adapt to Ethiopian changes could 
disadvantage China’s influence in the long run. Meanwhile, the United States is well 
situated to capitalize on potential decentralization because of its wide-ranging influence 
activities. However, at this critical juncture, the United States would be best served if it 
continually monitors and adapts to the dynamic political environment. The following 
chapter considers U.S. influence activities and policy objectives in Ethiopia.  
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III. UNITED STATES’ PURSUIT OF INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has and will continue to attempt to influence states, including 
Ethiopia, to better achieve its own objectives. In some cases, exerting such influence may 
be seen as infringing on sovereignty, while on other occasions it can be seen as a welcome 
bilateral action. For the United States, navigating this delicate political maneuver is 
particularly challenging with Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s self-perception as a high-capacity 
government, built on its unique imperial history (largely unblemished by colonial 
interference) makes sovereignty a core feature of government. Furtado and Smith best 
describe the nature of interstate relationships with Ethiopia: “One of the implications [of 
Ethiopia’s unique history of strong independent governance] is that the act of entering into 
relations with aid donors tended to be seen by Ethiopians at the time, and still is, as a 
meeting of equals.”165 While this may frustrate the United States, one should note that all 
states hoping to influence Ethiopia must contend with the same hesitancy on the part of the 
Ethiopian government. 
The nature of the Ethiopian government and people, which occasionally is an 
impediment to cooperation, also provides the United States unique opportunities. The 
Ethiopian government, at times brutal, repressive, and autocratic, is also singularly focused 
on its vision for the development.166 The Ethiopian elite, unlike many of its neighbors, is 
less interested in personal financial gain compared to delivering political promises based 
on development.167 Be it in terms of security, economic development, or healthcare, the 
United States must focus and act on areas of mutual interest to best influence the Ethiopian 
government. While cooperation outside these parameters is possible, and in some cases 
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necessary (where values do not intersect) such interaction is likely to generate resistance 
based on perceptions of impinged sovereignty. 
In terms of my overall analytic approach, this chapter reinforces earlier discussions 
on state interests. Here, both American and Ethiopian interests are delineated. I also 
incorporate the third and fourth analytical components: “influence activities” and 
“influence analysis.” This chapter identifies American interests in Ethiopia and assesses 
U.S.G. influence in that country. Three main influence considered are: security 
cooperation, economic cooperation, and humanitarian assistance. I will note where the 
United States is and is not successful, while providing explanations and suggestions where 
U.S. influence could be improved.  
Overall, the United States has successfully engaged with Ethiopia, despite 
Ethiopian esteem for sovereignty. The United States has remained a consistent partner with 
the Ethiopians, maintaining a diverse portfolio of influence activities. U.S. influence 
activities have consistently engaged Ethiopian political leadership, the military, and health 
sectors. The United States has been particularly effective at highlighting the benefits of 
security sector partnership, working closely with the Ethiopian military to achieve mutual 
foreign policy objectives in the region. Furthermore, the United States’ diversified portfolio 
means it could quickly adjust to the shifting power dynamics identified in Chapter II.  
B. U.S. INTERESTS IN ETHIOPIA—OVERVIEW 
The United States has four key interests in Ethiopia: state stability, human 
development, a strong economy, and promoting democracy and human rights. A stable 
Ethiopian state is the primary U.S. interest. The United States has looked upon Ethiopia as 
a stalwart ally in a region that is generally characterized by fragile states, especially 
Ethiopia’s neighbors Somalia, South Sudan, and recently Sudan. Through prioritizing 
security and stability, the United States has at times deemphasized governance and rule of 
law, with specific reference to human rights violations committed by the EPRDF. The 
Senate confirmation testimonies of the last three U.S. Ambassadors to Ethiopia have each 
underscored the security partnership between the states, yet acknowledge regime 
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shortcomings with regard to human rights and democratization.168 The strategic location 
of Ethiopia and the state’s willingness and ability to act as a regional CT partner and 
regional leader in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are consistently 
highlighted as successes by U.S. Ambassador-designees. These activities align with the 
United States’ broader military goals in the HOA, including minimizing the capabilities of 
violent extremist organizations and developing security in Somalia, preferably under the 
auspices of local states.169 Sustaining the 2018 momentum regarding the détente of the 
persistent Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict is a core security interest of the United States.  
The United States also maintains an interest in the human development, both in 
economic and health terms, of the Ethiopian people. Current U.S. Ambassador Michael 
Raynor’s testimony emphasizes that U.S. interest in human development (specifically 
health, education, food security and economic growth) is neatly aligned with that of the 
Ethiopian government.170 To the United States, investments in human development will 
pay long-term dividends in stability and countering the currents that could undermine 
regional security. In financial terms, human development projects are the most expensive 
set of U.S. activities in Ethiopia but are consistent with overall U.S. budgetary 
programming in Africa.  
Third, the United States would prefer a robust Ethiopian economy. The United 
States recognizes the exceptional recent growth of the Ethiopian economy vis-à-vis its 
neighbors and the entire East African region. The U.S.–Ethiopian economic relationship 
can best be described as skewed toward Ethiopian exports in primary commodities, 
especially coffee.171 However, PM Abiy’s commitment to economic privatization has 
                                                 
168 Haslach, Statement of Patricia M. Haslach Nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Booth, Statement of 
Donald E Booth Nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Raynor, Statement of Michael Arthur Raynor Nominee to be U.S. 
Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 
169 Thomas D. Waldhauser, “United States Africa Command Posture Statement” (2019), 11. 
170 Raynor, Statement of Michael Arthur Raynor Nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
171 “Ethiopia—Agoa.Info—African Growth and Opportunity Act,” accessed June 16, 2019, 
https://agoa.info/profiles/ethiopia.html. 
54 
sparked renewed U.S. interest in investment in Ethiopia.172 The Ethiopian regime also 
emphasizes the importance of the economy, considering economic growth the panacea that 
could cure all other domestic woes.173  
Finally, the United States is interested in promoting democracy and good 
governance in Ethiopia. As previously mentioned, this interest waxes and wanes depending 
on regional circumstances, especially security. However, widespread political protests 
within Ethiopia prove that governance issues unresolved threaten the security and stability 
so highly valued by the United States. Ambassador Raynor concedes that the reasons for 
political protests in Ethiopia are complicated but suggests that they are “rooted in popular 
desires for greater political freedom and civil liberties.”174 Thus, we should expect a 
renewed U.S. emphasis on democratization in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia peacefully transitioning toward a more representative democratic 
government while maintaining both external and internal stability is the best- case scenario 
for the United States. Ideally, Ethiopia would continue as an active Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO) Troop Contributing Country (TCC). While human development is  
an important standalone goal of U.S. policy, the U.S.G. mostly sees underdevelopment  
as an impediment to stability and security. Therefore, the U.S.G. hopes to mitigate 
underdevelopment a means to an end of a more stable partner. Economically, the United 
States would like to capitalize and allow American companies to compete as the Ethiopian 
government pushes toward privatization. The DoD’s best-case scenario in Ethiopia would 
include improved Ethiopian capacity to handle security concerns in the HOA. Furthermore, 
the DoD would prefer unfettered access to Ethiopia for transient military personnel and 
equipment. Access and overflight are especially important in Ethiopia because of the 
geographic position of the only permanent U.S. military facility in Africa, Camp 
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Lemmonier in Djibouti. Figure 2 demonstrates that Ethiopia lies in a critical position 
between U.S. forces in Djibouti and the primary areas of interest for the DoD in Africa. 
The United States clearly maintains a security presence in countries other than those 
depicted in Figure 2; however, the highlighted states are currently or recently involved with 
American CT objectives. Based on this context, expanded access to Ethiopian airfields for 
U.S. aircraft would be tremendously valuable, due to the dearth of reliable locations 
elsewhere near Camp Lemmonier. 
 
Figure 2. Sub-Saharan African Nations with U.S. Military Presence175 
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C. INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES 
The following sections will address specific actions that the U.S.G. has pursued in 
Ethiopia. Part 1 will consider U.S. influence activities in the Security Sector. Part 2 will 
consider U.S. influence activities in the healthcare sector. Part 3 considers U.S. influence 
activities pertaining to economic cooperation and assistance. 
1. Security Sector Assistance 
U.S. Security Sector Assistance (SSA) programs vary by funding and execution 
authority. The system is complex but can be condensed to consider two broad SSA types. 
Though they both might be managed within a country by the same personnel (typically 
DoD), they derive their authorities from separate legal authorities: Title 10 and Title 22.176 
Title 10 programs are funded and administered by the DoD. Conversely, Title 22 programs 
are funded and administered by the DoS, but often executed by DoD personnel.177 Prior to 
2001 almost all SSA was administered through Title 22 authorities. This distinction is 
important because specific programs under one authority may be subject to additional legal 
scrutiny. The scope of Title 10 programs greatly increased worldwide under the auspices 
of the Bush administration’s CT paradigm, but this transformation is especially evident  
in Africa.  
a. Activities 
The United States primarily uses reward and expert power in its efforts to influence 
Ethiopia in the security arena. Varying levels of aid since 2001 constitute the “carrots” that 
the United States thinks will motivate Ethiopia to pursue policies that support U.S. efforts. 
Despite Ethiopia’s proud military heritage, it understands that it can learn from and emulate 
U.S. CT efforts. The United States desires that Ethiopia act as a competent regional military 
force that can “police its neighborhood.”   
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The U.S.G. engages in many types of SSA in Ethiopia. Figure 3 breaks down 
different programs’ funding levels. The Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority is the 
United States’ most expensive single program in the entire portfolio. This program exists 
to support training Ethiopian forces to field a more effective and professional fighting force 
but, as a Title 10 mechanism, can be used in a fairly versatile fashion. One of the specific 
goals for 1206 funding is likely to be the development of ENDF capacity to field forces for 
United Nations (UN) PKOs.  
 
Figure 3. Overall U.S. Security Aid to Ethiopia from 2001–2018178 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is the next-largest program by percentage of 
funding. This is a Title 22 mechanism in which the United States pays for American 
equipment for a foreign military. The financial levels of FMF remained fairly constant 
between 2008 and 2016. The high cost of FMF programs propel this category above less 
expensive, but more common programs that focus on individual training. FMF, the U.S.’ 
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primary method for transferring arms to Ethiopia has only supplied 2.8% of Ethiopia’s 
arms since 2001. In absolute terms, this has amounted to $46M of arms sold by the United 
States.179 Instead, Ethiopia has largely imported arms from former Communist states, most 
notably Russia, which is typical in Africa. Although Ethiopia appears to have ceased 
purchasing Russian arms in 2010, it continues to purchase weapons of similar type and 
origin from China and Ukraine.180 
The third largest bilateral SSA program by funding level is International Military 
Education and Training (IMET). This Title 22 program is one of the mainstays of U.S. 
SSA. IMET programs typically train individuals from the target nation in various U.S. 
schools and centers.181 IMET itself is not one school or training program; rather it is the 
mechanism that allows the U.S.G. to organize and pay for foreign military students to train 
and learn in the United States. The United States hosts Ethiopian military students in a 
variety of global programs through IMET provisions. The funding for IMET programs, 
though reductions were threatened, has remained mostly stable in recent years. IMET and 
other individual training programs work toward creating stability and security in the long-
term. Therefore, they are consistent with overall influence activities promoted by the 
U.S.G.. These education programs typically emphasize professionalism and create long-
term relationships between Ethiopians and Americans. 
The United States also provides SSA to Ethiopia via other mechanisms. In addition 
to the typical bilateral programs mentioned above, Ethiopia receives funding from a DoS 
initiative called the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. This initiative, 
administered by the DoS’ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
focuses on security sector institutions with East African states. This Title 22 program is 
therefore consistent with the United States’ overall vision and objectives for Ethiopia. 
Another source of security assistance is the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program 
(CTFP), under the authority of Title 10. The purpose of CTFP is to train partner security 
                                                 
179 “SIPRI Arms Export Data,” accessed February 14, 2019, 
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php. 
180 “SIPRI Arms Export Data.” 
181 The Management of Security Cooperation, 1–4. 
59 
and defense officials (typically mid and senior level) by organizing and funding various 
engagement events related to CT.182 Another program, unfortunately titled the 
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) is tied more directly to concrete capabilities 
and operations against terrorists. This program was proposed and implemented by the 
Obama administration.183 However, domestic U.S. opposition, especially with regard to 
CTPF usage to support Syrian opposition, has prompted the Trump administration to make 
significant cuts to the program.  
Another program listed in Figure 3 is Excess Defense Articles. This program is 
contained within the broader Foreign Military Sales (FMS) umbrella but is handled 
uniquely. Unlike a typical Title 22 FMS program, where a recipient country selects and 
buys (with their own money) specific military materiel or training, the Excess Defense 
Articles provisions allows the United States to transfer out-of-service equipment to 
approved recipients. This equipment is either sold at a reduced rate or is transferred via a 
grant, on a case-by-case basis.184 A recent transfer of several C-130E transport aircraft to 
the Ethiopian Air Force was accomplished using the “Excess Defense Articles” provision. 
The United States justified this transfer by emphasizing the aircraft would be used to 
resupply and transport its regional PKOs and assist in humanitarian operations.185 
Although this program is typically funded by the recipient country, the United States can, 
in certain circumstances, fully fund the transfer. This is likely what occurred in the 
Ethiopian C-130E program. 
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Overall, between 2001 and 2018, almost two- thirds of U.S. SSA funding originated 
from the DoD.186 This distribution is consistent with the general trend of increased funding 
of the DoD at the expense of the DoS. However, this shift also signals a change of 
responsibility. While programs are still nominally coordinated with the DoS, their 
oversight capacity is diminished. Such a shift might advance regional DoD objectives at 
the expense of the U.S. DoS’ country plans for Ethiopia. 
Since 2001 the United States has spent over $142M on various security assistance 
items and programs in Ethiopia.187 However, the United States spends nearly  five times 
as much on neighboring Kenya, and almost ten times as much in Somalia.188 It stands to 
reason that funding a formerly failed state, such as Somalia, is expensive; therefore, that  
explains that state’s level of funding. It is less clear why the United States spends less in 
Ethiopia than Kenya, when both have played an active role in the African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM) and other regional PKOs.  
According to Colonel T. Bruce Sweeney, former U.S. Senior Defense Official and 
Defense Attaché to Ethiopia, two factors contribute to the minimal weapons transfers from 
the United States. First, the United States does not supply more weapons because of the 
Ethiopian regime’s human rights issues. Second, Ethiopia is interested in maintaining 
internal materiel compatibility.189 This factor is particularly critical for the expensive and 
technologically complex military equipment that the United States is known to provide, 
such as aircraft and armored vehicles. To the Ethiopian government, replacing some of its 
Soviet-style weaponry with U.S. or NATO-specification weapons would create operability 
challenges that are greater than the perceived benefit of this new equipment.190 This 
suggests that although the United States is interested in training Ethiopian forces, at the 
moment it seems apathetic in becoming the primary arms supplier to the Ethiopian 
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government. Furthermore, Ethiopians seem uninterested in acquiring American equipment. 
Another possible reason for American hesitation, though less compelling, is that lobbying 
by the Ethiopian diaspora in the United States limits U.S.G. support to an allegedly 
authoritarian regime.191 
The C-130E program provides an interesting window into U.S. influence activities 
in SSA. First, the aircraft in question are not the cutting-edge equipment more typical of 
U.S. FMS. Instead, these are older and cheaper aircraft, but can provide the Ethiopian Air 
Force a capability they currently lack. Furthermore, if used properly, these aircraft can 
facilitate improved capability in regional PKOs, which is one of the United States’ overall 
goals in Ethiopia. The aircraft type’s explicit “transport” type also makes the program less 
likely to be used inappropriately. The C-130E transfer will require considerable resources 
and effort from the ENDF to successfully maintain, which is a potential program pitfall. It 
is unclear that this program has compelled the Ethiopian regime to change its behavior, 
though the necessary training that would make these aircraft usable could be conditionally 
tied to regime or military behavior. This provides a future opportunity for the United States 
to turn this program into additional access. Additional training and maintenance equipment 
could provide justification for greater U.S. access in Ethiopia.  
SSA programs in Ethiopia were cut after 2016, likely due to the Obama and Trump 
administrations’ disapproval of the regime’s human rights violations and general 
authoritarian tendencies. These cuts’ likely effects on Ethiopian state stability are 
ambiguous. However, Watts finds that decreasing FMF-that is reducing “free” arms 
transfers-can yield a more stable state, although he acknowledges that this result is not as 
statistically significant as the relationship between military education programs and 
stability.192  
                                                 
191 Lyons, “Diaspora Lobbying and Ethiopian Politics.” 
192 Stephen Watts, “Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa’s Fragile 
States,” Product Page, 2015, 12, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR808.html. 
62 
b. Influence Analysis  
The United States enjoys a relatively high return on security sector investment in 
Ethiopia. It modestly contributes to a professional military in areas where both states can 
find cooperation beneficial. While this relationship does not grant the United States cart 
blanche to dictate policy priorities or accommodate large numbers of American troops, it 
is nonetheless a valuable investment.  
The United States’ SSA influence activities in Ethiopia have had varying levels of 
success. The United States can and does find areas to influence in the security sector. The 
United States is most successful when it exploits significant overlap in interests with the 
Ethiopian government. Such overlap is most obvious in both nations’ interest to eliminate 
CT threats (Al Shabaab), and other activities which generally stabilize the Horn of Africa 
(HOA). 
One area of mutual interest was Ethiopian participation in UN PKOs. Ethiopia has 
mobilized 18,322 forces since 2001.193 In 2013, Ethiopia was the 4th largest contributor 
(by number of troops) worldwide, and the greatest in Africa.194 In 2018, Ethiopia became 
the world’s greatest UN TCC.195 While many of these forces have been used in close 
proximity to Ethiopia, several have been deployed further afield, including in Liberia, 
Central African Republic, and Cote D’Ivoire. In the same period (2001–2018) Ethiopia has 
participated in six UN PKOs, frequently manning several simultaneously.196 U.S. SSA has 
improved the Ethiopian military’s capabilities in these PKOs. For example, Colonel 
Sweeney identified a DoD program to equip the ENDF with radios allowed Ethiopian 
ground forces and increased capability for command and control in Somalia.197 Such a 
                                                 
193 “Data,” Vito D’Orazio, accessed February 14, 2019, http://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html. 
194 Scott Firsing, “Thinking through the Role of Africa’s Militaries in Peacekeeping: The Cases of 
Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda,” South African Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 
52, https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2014.894685. 
195 Tomas F Husted et al., “Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement,” n.d., 8. 
196 “Data.” 
197 Sweeney, Interview with Colonel Bruce Sweeney. 
63 
project demonstrates an ideal situation for the United States. It was able to jointly identify 
a need, provide for that need, and improve the partner effectiveness.  
It is nonetheless difficult to determine whether Ethiopian participation is due to 
United States influence, Ethiopian internal policy, or some combination of each. Though 
convenient to suggest that Ethiopian participation was a direct result of U.S. influence, the 
evidence is uncertain. It is most likely that Ethiopia had its own political and security 
justifications for participating in these PKOs. As Firsing suggests “developing countries 
often contribute troops owing to the financial opportunity this activity presents for the 
country, the military institution and the individual troops.”198 Ethiopia also understood 
domestic stability benefits by participating in AMISOM. Zimmerman suggests that 
Ethiopians are still involved in Somalia because they see it as bringing order to their 
neighborhood.199 
If stability in Somalia is one of the ultimate goals of U.S. influence, however, the 
results are concerning. Before participating under the auspices of AMISOM, Ethiopia was 
largely successful in the unilateral military defeat of the Union of Islamic Courts, the 
predecessors to Al Shabaab.200 Though this unilateral effort was militarily effective, it was 
unsustainable in the long-run, based on the need for much greater investment and 
involvement than Ethiopia alone could provide. Likely because of this realization, 
Ethiopians joined the broader efforts of AMISOM.201 The effectiveness of UN PKOs in 
Somalia has come into question, and some cite Ethiopian participation as a destabilizing 
factor. Most troubling, Ethiopian forces have been accused of perpetrating war crimes.202 
Zimmerman and others have highlighted this argument, articulating that some Ethiopian 
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forces are perceived as occupiers, rather than liberators.203 Furthermore, in 2016, a large 
contingent of Ethiopian forces were withdrawn to deal with domestic unrest in Oromia.204 
Zimmerman contends that this troop withdrawal has afforded Al Shabaab to recapture lost 
territory.205 Thus, even when the United States may consider Ethiopian participation a 
success of its own, its participation should not be taken for granted, and the conduct of its 
forces should be a persistent cause of concern.  
The United States has also been less successful in compelling ENDF forces to 
behave professionally. This misbehavior had ramifications in Somalia and during 
Ethiopian domestic protests in the Oromo and Amhara regions. In the short term, U.S.G. 
security policy has done little to help or hinder this situation. It is unclear whether IMET 
or any other long running professionalization programs did anything to prevent the security 
services and military from violently cracking down on protesters. According to the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), relatively low cost IMET programs can generate 
significant results. They argue “having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders 
with firsthand knowledge of America will make a difference in winning access and 
influence for our diplomatic and military representatives.”206 IMET garnered consistent 
funding in Ethiopia until 2018, where it was increased by 45%.207 Increased funding is 
likely a result of PM Abiy’s appointment and commitment to reform. 
Karlin suggests that, to bolster U.S. influence and to improve the effectiveness of 
target military, the United States take a more active role in personnel decisions with a target 
military.208 She notes that in historical cases where this happened, SSA efforts were 
bolstered. Due to the delicate bilateral relationship between the United States and Ethiopia, 
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however, DoD should be cognizant of perceptions of overreach. Ethiopian military reforms 
initiated by PM Abiy afford the United States an opportunity to delicately broach this 
subject. The United States should see reform as an opportunity to encourage the ENDF to 
pursue best policies while eliminating adverse practices.  
U.S. SSA may have been more successful in preventing terrorism in Ethiopia. 
Although terrorism plagues neighboring states, Ethiopia has suffered very few large-scale 
terrorist attacks on its soil. Ethiopia routinely shares CT information with the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), including access to evidence and witnesses.209 Thus, the 
U.S.G. seems more capable of engendering positive relationships on specific tasks, such as 
CT, while less likely to convince an authoritarian regime to democratize. 
The Ethiopian state is on-track to claw-back from the internal security and stability 
setbacks associated with political upheaval in the Oromo and Amhara regions. In the short-
term U.S.G. security policy has done little to help or hinder this situation. It is unclear 
whether IMET or any other long running professionalization programs did anything to 
prevent the security services and military from violently cracking down on protesters. 
According to a report by Stephen Watts (RAND), decreasing education and training 
programs such as IMET may decrease state stability.210 Decreasing funding for IMET 
programs, though a political option, threatens the long-term U.S.–Ethiopia bilateral 
relationship and should be avoided. Colonel Sweeney emphasized that the Ethiopian 
government has not reacted negatively to the reductions in other SSA programs.211  
One of the United States’ main security objectives in the region, having African 
nations supporting African PKOs, has been achieved through Ethiopian participation. 
However, the United States seeks to motivate Ethiopia to participate in such operations, 
and therefore security cooperation hopes to improve PKO effectiveness, and continue 
Ethiopian participation, regardless of initial motivation. Just for United Nations (UN) 
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support, Ethiopia willingly supporting many PKOs directly bolsters AFRICOM strategic 
objectives of African nations providing the security solutions for African problems. 
Furthermore, participation in PKOs for participation’s sake is not the ultimate goal of 
AFRICOM’s “African Solutions to African Problems”. 
One area of mutual interest was Ethiopian participation in UN PKOs. Furthermore, 
the United States identified areas where they could mitigate some of the challenges faced 
by the Ethiopian military.  
Access is another essential goal of U.S. influence in Ethiopia. Colonel Sweeney 
notes that Ethiopia has a history of limiting U.S. personnel or aircraft to stage out of 
Ethiopia.212 He notes that Ethiopia’s concern with sovereignty and proud national tradition 
drive these actions, and the United States should not expect unlimited access to airfields or 
other staging areas. Rather, the United States should anticipate limited access, either by 
time or by geographic area, in Ethiopia. U.S. influence have improved these conditions, 
but policymakers should expect middling progress in this endeavor. 
Ethiopia’s sovereignty concerns are not limited to the United States. All foreign 
governments face the same skepticism and difficulties with regard to expanding general 
cooperation. The United States is most likely to enjoy better access when it can demonstrate 
the mutual benefits of cooperation.213 The C-130E program may afford the United States 
a renewed opportunity to broaden American access in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, progress is 
likely to be slow in regard to U.S. access.  
c. Future SSA Funding Challenges and Opportunities 
Several whole-of-government factors may modify the U.S.–-Ethiopia security 
relationship. The first is the DoD’s increased funding under the Trump Administration. 
The second is the Administration’s proposed DoS budget cuts.214 The third is the paradigm 
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shift away from CT and toward Great Power Competition. The first two factors are subject 
to Congressional approval. Historical precedent indicates that the DOS will not lose 
funding. In both 2018 and 2019 Congress maintained a constant DoS budget despite 
significant cuts proposed by the administration.215 The DoD, however, is likely to continue 
to receive elevated funding, though some domestic projects may undercut some of the 
available funds for its international programs. The paradigm shift away from CT has yet to 
be quantified in terms of allocations for programs, DoD or otherwise.216 
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s recent reforms afford an opportunity for increased activities 
and funding between the DoD and the Ethiopian military. The situation in Ethiopia is 
unique and dynamic, but another case study is illustrative of improved possibilities. The 
overall bilateral relationship between the United States and Tunisia drastically improved 
following the Arab Spring in 2011, particularly in the security realm. The Obama 
administration’s 2015 declaration of Tunisia as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” paved the way 
for increased training opportunities, equipment loans, and financial assistance for 
American defense articles.217 Additionally, United States military assistance to Tunisia 
doubled since the Arab Spring in 2011.218 The implications for PM Abiy’s Ethiopia are 
striking. The government could stand to receive a considerable amount of equipment and 
training if it so desires. However, Ethiopia and Tunisia are very different states, contending 
with a different set of domestic and regional challenges. Ethiopia is less likely to request 
the same military equipment that Tunisia received, for reasons mentioned below. For 
reasons of sovereignty and pride it is also less likely to accept elevated levels of American 
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forces for unspecified amounts of time.219 Thus, the United States should act cautiously, 
by only funding and equipping programs that Ethiopia and the United States both deem 
important in improving security and stability.  
Despite low per-program costs, the long gap between execution and pay-out might 
make IMET programs a target for budget cuts. However, based on the United States’ long-
term goals and objectives in Ethiopia, including access, overflight and state stability, IMET 
funding should be safeguarded. The ENDF highly values the strategic partnership and 
training opportunities that IMET programs create. These programs are particularly 
effective because they come during a period of Security Sector Reform. Thus, the United 
States should capitalize on Ethiopian desire and low relative costs and expand its IMET 
programs in Ethiopia.  
2. Medical and Humanitarian Assistance or Strategic Health Diplomacy  
Another key component of the relationship between the United States and Ethiopia 
is medical and humanitarian assistance. The United States sees HIV/AIDS and other 
medical crises as threats to security and stability, and inhibitors of overall development. In 
this realm, like in the security sector, the United States hopes to improve Ethiopian 
capacity, with an underlying assumption that improvements in the humanitarian sector will 
yield improvements in overall stability. Participating in many of these programs can also 
enhance the quality of life for many individuals.  
Some could argue that medical and humanitarian aid could be considered a reward 
or gift, acting as a form of leverage for other policy areas. However, reducing humanitarian 
and medical aid for misbehavior in other sectors, such as governance, is likely to precipitate 
two outcomes, neither of which are in the United States’ interest. First, and most 
importantly, reducing aid as a penalty for noncompliance is likely to decrease stability and  
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quality of life for many Ethiopians. As long- term stability and security is the United States’ 
primary goal in Ethiopia, the implications of cutting humanitarian and medical aid are 
obvious. Second, as discussed by Raven, such retaliatory action would color subsequent 
relations between the two parties.220 Ethiopia is likely to perceive the action as coercion 
and may resent overall U.S. influence.221  
a. Key Influence Activities 
In a comparison of all donor countries, Ethiopia receives its greatest bilateral 
development aid from the United States.222 The health sector is the most significant sector 
of that overall aid allotment. In absolute terms, the United States has provided Ethiopia 
with over $3 billion over the last fifteen years for HIV/AIDS projects and approximately 
$200 million per year for other healthcare projects. The U.S.G. values Strategic Health 
Diplomacy (SHD) as a means to improve lives around the world while still “advancing 
[U.S.] national interests, making other countries more stable and the U.S. more secure.”223 
Therefore, SHD, while very much focused on tangible health improvements, should be 
justifiable to U.S. taxpayers. Aside from the pure healthcare goals, SHD aims to create 
goodwill, improve conditions for trade, and develop more resilient states built on stable 
foundations.224 The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is one 
funding stream that the United States uses to resource specific SHD projects.  
SHD programs the U.S.G. has pursued in Ethiopia include healthcare infrastructure, 
training programs, and exchanges. One example of an infrastructure project is the 
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Shashemene Outpatient Center.225 This $3.6 million project was funded by PEPFAR and 
is a rare example of a U.S. infrastructure project in Ethiopia. Most U.S. SHD investment 
finances training, medicine, and other less-visible projects..226 These efforts contribute to 
human development, which in turn creates a more stable and secure Ethiopia.  
The United States’ SHD in Ethiopia involves multiple power mechanisms, 
including informational and expert power. As previously discussed, there is also an element 
of reward power associated with these projects. However, since the reaction to cancelling 
programs altogether would be extremely damaging, the United States is now effectively 
locked in to providing them. Thus, in reality, the programs may not function as a reward.  
b. Influence Analysis 
The United States sees improvements in SHD as a means of improving the security 
and stability of Ethiopia. Health challenges tend to be one of Ethiopia’s most significant 
impediments toward achieving higher levels of human development. U.S. influence 
activities are providing improved quality of life for many Ethiopians and are therefore 
contributing toward a more stable future. According to USAID, since 1990, U.S.G. SHD 
has saved millions of lives, reduced child mortality by 66%, and significantly reduced the 
chance of death from malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV.227 The required financial investment 
is extreme, but so are the results. Nonetheless, U.S. influence is less obvious with this 
investment. Although, in general terms, U.S. SHD has improved living conditions, it is 
difficult to concretely link specific U.S. measures to measurable nation-wide outcomes. As 
a result, the U.S.G. derives less prestige from these investments.  
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In addition, not all of the U.S.G. efforts in SHD are considered positive. Lee and 
Izama conclude that “while PEPFAR has been relatively successful in saving the lives of 
HIV/AIDS patients, our findings suggest that it may have done so at the cost of weakening 
the capacity of the state health system.”228 Thus, PEPFAR typically produces favorable 
health outcomes but any targeted aid program can weaken indigenous state institutions that 
would normally deal with the problem that aid is attempting to fix. Given the U.S. objective 
of enhancing Ethiopian capacity, this program’s potential to deteriorate local capacity is 
concerning. However, the U.S. emphasis on developing Ethiopian healthcare professionals 
shows its commitment to addressing this shortfall.229 The United States should continue to 
prioritize increasing Ethiopian capacity in this sector. 
Daschle and Frist demonstrate that PEPFAR also improves the United States’ 
political capital with ordinary Ethiopians. Figure 4 shows changes in public opinion of the 
United States between 2007 and 2011. PEPFAR states consistently hold the United States 
in a higher regard than the global average. Public opinion can be a useful facilitator of 
American influence activities. Positive perceptions about the United States allow the 
U.S.G. more options in future interactions and allow the U.S.G. more flexibility in pursuing 
new or different influence activities in Ethiopia. Daschle and Frist also underscore further 
PEPFAR successes, notably worker output, human development, and recipient countries’ 
Sustainable Economic Development Assessment scores.230 The decline in HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in militaries is an even more concrete success of PEPFAR, and this directly 
enhances DoD efforts to build partner capacity.231 
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Figure 4. Public Opinion of U.S. in PEPFAR Countries232  
Previous and current decreases in PEPFAR funding threaten the success of these 
programs, both in medical terms and in terms of perceptions of the United States. 
According to Health Policy Plus, which is associated with both the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and PEPFAR, reduced funding threatens to reverse 
the substantial progress in preventing and treating HIV/AIDS.233  As long as the U.S.G. 
values long-term stability in Ethiopia, it should continue to prioritize PEPFAR programs 
and avoid the Trump administration’s proposed cuts.  
Overall, the effects of U.S. SHD influence activities have been mixed. As 
previously stated, the medical realities are stark: PEPFAR works to reduce HIV/AIDS 
deaths and improves the lives of those living with the disease. In terms of engendering 
goodwill among everyday Ethiopians, the program has achieved moderate success. As 
noted above, the projects improve public attitudes towards the United States. However, 
they do not garner the same domestic and international media attention as other prestige 
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projects (including infrastructure projects completed by the People’s Republic of China). 
The United States should continue its efforts in SHD but attempt to better “advertise” its 
SHD-related accomplishments, so that their effectiveness is recognized locally. The U.S.G. 
must also do a better job of expressing the benefits of SHD to the American taxpayer, in 
order to maintain the considerable momentum and results that its programs have created.  
3. Economic Influence 
The Ethiopian economy is a great source of the state’s prestige but is also a great 
cause for domestic concern. As discussed in Chapter II, the EPRDF stakes its legitimacy 
on providing strong economic opportunities for its citizens. GDP growth is a metric of 
particular interest to the state. The United States also is interested in Ethiopia maintaining 
and growing a robust economy, for the purpose of averting instability and insecurity. The 
United States sees economic development as an opportunity to reduce the stressors which 
contribute to long term domestic unrest. 
Most of the U.S.–Ethiopia economic relationship is between private American 
companies and their Ethiopian private counterparts or state- owned enterprises (SOEs). 
The United States’ lack of SOEs makes the relationship somewhat incongruent. Thus, 
because the U.S.G. has few formal channels to direct its own companies’ business dealings, 
it is necessarily limited in the way it can influence overall American investment in Ethiopia. 
However, because the regime has staked its success on economic development, the United 
States can apply some pressure to the EPRDF.  
a. Influence Activities 
Historically, the Ethiopian economy has been concentrated in the public sector.234 
However, PM Abiy has promoted a shift toward privatization. This adjustment affords 
economic opportunities and incentives for both the United States and Ethiopia. PM Abiy 
has actively courted foreign investment in Ethiopian business.235 The United States has 
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approached privatization in Ethiopia vigorously, as evidenced by programs such as the 
Ethiopia Partnerships Forum. This forum, held in May 2019, brought together 400 
Ethiopian business leaders with U.S.G. representatives to discuss bilateral trade and other 
economic issues.236 Thus, while the U.S.G. is unable to force its private businesses to 
invest in Ethiopia, it is attempting to encourage their participation. 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is another avenue for the United 
States to encourage American investment in Ethiopia. The MCC is an officially funded 
program that administers U.S. foreign assistance to select states. The MCC’s unique 
approach emphasizes rigorous and transparent country selection criteria, assessing a broad 
range of policies.237 The MCC publishes scorecards that measure both economic policy as 
well as governance and other social indicators. Some examples of the economic indicators 
that the MCC consider are “Land Rights and Access” and “Inflation.”238 Ethiopia currently 
meets 8 of the required 20 criteria to be eligible for an MCC compact (agreement).239  
For states that do not meet the criteria, the MCC can implement an MCC 
“Threshold Program” that is designed to provide assistance so a state can comply with 
more selection indicators.240 On March 1, 2019, the MCC announced Ethiopia’s eligibility 
for the Threshold Program.241 Ambassador Raynor noted that “this opportunity would not 
be possible without the concrete steps the Ethiopian government has already taken toward 
democratic and economic reform. It’s a strong expression of the United States’ confidence 
in the Ethiopian government’s determination to fully achieve its reform agenda, and of our 
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commitment to support the Ethiopian government in ensuring the reforms are successful 
and sustainable.”242  
The Threshold Plan creates further opportunities for the U.S.G. to influence 
Ethiopia. Specifically, the MCC can stipulate economic liberalization conditions, which 
the U.S.G. sees as a mutually beneficial opportunity. Ethiopia has traditionally been 
reluctant to allow donors to drive policy changes; it can and does limit direct donor 
influence on policy-making by restricting access to certain economic areas.243 The 
Ethiopian government imposes these limits both to reduce outside influence on policy 
changes and also to motivate foreign governments to contribute with direct budget support, 
rather than to simply finance foreign activities. The United States could leverage Threshold 
Plan participation upon access to key policy-making venues.  
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is another U.S. economic 
influence activity in Ethiopia. AGOA grants certain African countries preferential trade 
agreements in certain duty-free sectors, in order to stimulate their economies.244 Not all 
African states are admitted into the program and the United States uses the program to 
reward states with which the United States maintains a positive relationship. Ethiopia’s 
participation in the AGOA program indicates its willingness to “play by American rules.” 
The United States could threaten access to AGOA as a way to obtain leverage. However, 
as with other development-focused projects, the greatest impacts of suspending the 
program would be felt by middle- or lower-class Ethiopians.  
b. Influence Analysis 
Despite the limited range of economic influence activities available to it, the U.S.G. 
has been moderately successful in shaping Ethiopia’s economic sector. The U.S.G. believes 
that economic liberalization, which its activities support, provides Ethiopians the greatest 
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opportunity for economic development. However, U.S. influence activities have done little 
outside the economic sector to grant the United States greater leverage in other sectors. 
Had the Ethiopian government chosen to eschew American economic involvement in favor 
of other investors (such as China), U.S. economic influence could be considered a failure. 
The United States can consider its efforts a moderate success because the Ethiopian 
government has expressed continued interest in economic programs tied to conditionality. 
While the progress needed to attain an MCC compact would be concrete proof that U.S. 
influence activities are successful, Ethiopia’s acceptance in the threshold program 
demonstrates an important first step.  
It is unlikely, however, that Ethiopia’s commitment to market privatization was 
only a result of U.S. influence. It is also unlikely that the United States’ economic influence 
activities played a significant role in PM Abiy’s reforms, targeting corruption and violent 
repression. The end result is nonetheless in-line with the U.S.G.’s overall interest in 
Ethiopian economic prosperity as a driver of general stability. By eagerly showing interest 
in Ethiopian businesses, the United States is poised to remain a robust trade partner with 
Ethiopia. The Ethiopian economy’s recent signs of deceleration are concerning, and it is 
unclear if Ethiopia can regain the momentum its growth trajectory. To prevent a slowdown, 
the U.S.G. must continue programs that provide incentives to Ethiopian economic sectors, 
such as AGOA and the MCC. 
Even if it maintains these programs, the United States’ economic activities are 
unlikely to generate a large amount of influence in Ethiopia because it is not one of the 
country’s biggest trading partners. In terms of both imports and exports, China is far more 
active than any other country in Ethiopia.245 Realistically, the U.S.G. is unwilling and 
unable to change this status quo. Nonetheless, the United States can and should maintain 
influence in shaping Ethiopia’s shift toward a private market. Promoting U.S. businesses’ 
investment in this market will widen the connections between the states, thus strengthening 
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the bilateral relationship. Disengaging stands to economically and politically benefit the 
U.S.’ strategic competitors. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The U.S.G. hopes to improve state security and stability in Ethiopia. This 
foundational objective colors the many activities the United States pursues. While PM 
Abiy’s reforms have complicated this objective, they also provide an increasing 
opportunity for American involvement. The United States successfully capitalizes on a 
shared security vision. Interests are aligned, allowing the United States flexibility and 
leverage. SSA fosters ties between the United States and the Ethiopian executive and 
military. This connection has served the interests of both states and provided the central 
connection for the past 15 years.  
Other U.S. influence activities develop influence in Ethiopia. Health sector 
cooperation, dependent on expert power, broadens American influence activities outside 
of the traditional executive and military realms. However, influence activities in the 
economic sector are limited and stagnant. The United States’ limited toolkit in the 
economic sector, especially when compared to China, decreases American influence. The 
next chapter will consider China’s interests and activities in Ethiopia. Though their greatest 
connection depends on shared economic interest, new programs indicate China’s 
aspirations for greater overall influence. 
Ethiopian agency limits foreign influence. Meanwhile, shifting Ethiopian political 
dynamics muddles assessments of U.S. activities and their results. However, despite these 
challenges, American influence activities have set a solid foundation for an enduring 
relationship. Nonetheless, U.S. practitioners and policymakers should continually  
analyze the program effectiveness of ongoing and proposed activities. Such reassessment 
is especially important considering current political developments, and the opportunities 
they create. 
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IV. CHINESE INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN ETHIOPIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The official relationship between Ethiopia and the PRC began in 1971.246 While it 
was not the first interaction between the states, that meeting between Haile Selassie and 
Mao Zedong is emblematic of their current relationship. During this meeting the PRC and 
Ethiopia agreed on trade deals, economic agreements, and technical cooperation.247 Such 
cooperation continues today, and has expanded since 1995, to the benefit of both states.248   
The narrative of China’s malign, wide-reaching influence in Africa is well-worn. 
Such discussion omits the diversity of capacity and varying perceptions of sovereignty 
within Africa’s 54 states. Unlike some of its neighbors, Ethiopia is uniquely suited to 
withstand China’s more predatory tactics while extracting benefits for the Ethiopian 
people, its government, and the EPRDF.249 Ethiopia does see China as one important, 
though not exclusive, source of investment and trade. Shinn argues that China is Ethiopia’s 
“most important bilateral economic partner.”250 The Ethiopian government also fashions 
itself uniquely capable of executing China’s “alternative development model.”251 The 
United States should recognize that Ethiopia can and will seek such advice and investment 
in part because it is not tied to Western political conditionality.252 
This chapter, like the previous chapter, supports the “state interests,” “influence 
activities,” and “influence analysis” components of my analytic approach. China has 
profited by developing mutual interests in the economic sphere. This connection and 
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emphasis on development has established connections between the Ethiopian and Chinese 
executives. Such cooperation has been fruitful, but China’s concentration of effort in this 
sector means its influence is limited in other sectors. As political dynamics shift, and the 
importance of the executive wanes, the Chinese will have to rapidly adapt its activities to 
maintain influence.  
This chapter considers the relationship between China and Ethiopia. First, I will 
introduce why China is interested in influencing Ethiopia. Thereafter I analyze 
conventional Chinese influence sectors: infrastructure and economic cooperation. Next, I 
will consider unconventional sectors: military cooperation and humanitarian assistance. 
These sectors are particularly interesting because they are more typically associated with 
Western diplomacy efforts, especially of the United States. Finally, I consider the unique 
challenges that China faces in Ethiopia. 
B. WHY DOES CHINA INTERACT WITH ETHIOPIA? 
Despite the country’s dearth of the mineral wealth, China has many reasons to 
pursue a strong relationship with Ethiopia. As Cabestan argues, “Chinese motivations in 
the country are not mainly economic: Ethiopia is not among the group of major suppliers 
of raw material to the ‘workshop of the world’; above all, the motivations are diplomatic, 
strategic, and even ideological.”253 Diplomatically, China hopes to have its agenda 
supported in international forums by as many partners as possible. Strategically, the  
PRC hopes to protect its considerable human and physical infrastructure in the region.  
A stable Ethiopian state is a key avenue for protecting China’s many citizens in the region. 
Ideologically, the Chinese seek to legitimize their state system, even if they do not hope  
to directly export it. Though its goals are wide-reaching, China’s normal toolkit of 
infrastructure, too- good-to-be-true loans, and cultural exchanges are on full display in  
its relationship with Ethiopia. Table 1 summarizes China’s primary goals and methods  
in Ethiopia.  
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Table 1. Chinese Goals in Ethiopia  
Sector Primary Goal Methods 





Economic Open Ethiopian market to Chinese 













Strategic Stability/Security for Chinese personnel 
and investments 
Military assistance 
and arms sales, 
telecommunications 
assistance, direct 
involvement (as a last 
resort) 
 
China hopes to achieve its diplomatic goals by maintaining an amiable relationship 
with Ethiopia. China’s primary diplomatic goal in Ethiopia is to sustain the government’s 
continued support for the One China Policy. The One China Policy supports the PRC’s 
dominion over Taiwan, which it views as a breakaway province. China has been succeeded 
in this goal, as statements by former PM Meles demonstrate: “Ethiopia strongly opposes 
any external force’s attempts to destroy China’s national unity and create hatred among 
Chinese nationalities.”254 China’s secondary diplomatic goal is to empower the Ethiopian 
government as a regional stalwart. Ethiopia is seat of the African Union, one of the 
multilateral forums that China depends upon for legitimacy. China’s appreciation for the 
institution is evident in its $200 million grant to construct a new conference center in Addis 
Ababa.255 The African Union project achieves two objectives for China. First, it 
demonstrates China’s commitment to that organization, which it hopes will continue 
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support for Beijing’s diplomatic efforts, as indicated above. Second, the conference center 
builds the prestige of Ethiopia. Bolstering Ethiopia’s regional reputation is valuable to 
China because it sees Ethiopia as a stabilizing force.256  
China derives legitimacy for its system, one where an authoritarian state with a 
tightly controlled economy can achieve tremendous economic development. This 
ideological connection was particularly effective with strongman PM Meles Zenawi. 
Meles, who seized power in 1991 eschewed the former regime’s Marxism in favor of an 
almost entirely development focused agenda and ideology. He never meant to fashion the 
Ethiopian state in China’s image, but sought the same economic growth associated with 
China’s ascendance. He also demonstrated similar propensities to jail dissidents, monitor 
citizens and eliminate political opposition: hallmarks of China’s Communist Party. Finally, 
Meles’ devotion to tackling corruption and achieving economic development made him an 
ideal exemplar of state-led development. China hopes that a blossoming Ethiopian 
economy and population will demonstrate the benefits of engaging at all levels with the 
PRC and of adopting a state-led development model.   
Though Cabestan deemphasizes Chinese economic motives in Ethiopia, there are 
some benefits to Chinese industries and economic interests. China recognizes the value of 
a robust economic relationship with Africa’s second-most populous state, and one of the 
continent’s fastest growing economies. Primarily, China hopes to open the Ethiopian 
market to Chinese products, services and companies. China also imports leather, sesame, 
coffee, and some textiles from Ethiopia.257 While these products are desired, none are 
essential to the Chinese. Nonetheless, China’s drastically increased imports of Ethiopian 
sesame indicates an economic area of mutual interest.258 Ethiopia’s first special economic 
zone, discussed below, also helps “China’s own economic restructuring, allowing less 
competitive and labor-intensive industries that are becoming increasingly more 
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competitive in the Chinese domestic market, such as textiles, leather goods, and building 
materials, to move offshore.”259  
China also hopes to safeguard its citizens and sizeable investments in Ethiopia. One 
case best exemplifies China’s challenge in this area. In 2007, a separatist group in the 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia attacked a small oil exploration site, killing nine Chinese 
employees and 65 of the Ethiopian soldiers tasked with defending the area.260 This 
situation highlighted China’s need to protect its citizens and investments in the region. It 
is likely that this incident spurred China’s active role in evacuating its citizens from Yemen 
during conflict escalation in 2015.261 China’s military asserted that it was the first time 
that it used its Navy to evacuate foreign nationals in addition to its own citizens.262 
Nonetheless, a strong Ethiopian state capable of exerting power throughout its territory is 
in China’s interests.  
C. CONVENTIONAL INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES 
China’s familiar African influence toolkit is employed in Ethiopia. Infrastructure 
and economic projects blend China’s expertise with Ethiopia’s seemingly never-ending 
demand for development. China successfully leverages the appeal of mutually beneficial 
programs to persuade the Ethiopian government to approve massive infrastructure 
programs, at times without a formal bidding process. Such tactics causes frustration, but 
the Ethiopian regime’s devotion to development has prevented it from substantially 
pushing back against China, its favored infrastructure partner. The following section will 
outline China’s main programs in this indispensable portion of its global toolkit.  
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1. Infrastructure 
China’s most visible contribution to the Ethiopian government and people is 
infrastructure projects. Cabestan highlights the strategy for a typical Chinese infrastructure 
project in Ethiopia: “the two governments together choose [a project and] a Chinese 
company wins the bid following a call for tenders; the projects are financed by Chinese 
banks with commercial loans guaranteed by the government and often at concessional 
terms.”263 The Chinese companies who carry out the projects typically hire Chinese labor 
for any skilled activities and import Chinese materials (in some cases due to a lack of 
Ethiopian equivalents). Occasionally, Ethiopians are hired in low-paid and low-skill jobs 
or in other marginal administrative roles.264 Despite occasional questions of quality, such 
projects draw admiration from ordinary Ethiopians and top elements of the Ethiopian 
government. Shinn highlights then-PM Meles’ comments that “China has been playing an 
irreplaceable role in our economy. It has unparalleled contribution towards funding 
infrastructure activities.”265 This comment may have been used to secure future Chinese 
investment; however, most scholars agree that infrastructure projects do indeed engender 
goodwill.266 The three main categories of Chinese infrastructure project are: (1) Roads, 
(2) Hydroelectric Dams, and (3) Telecommunications. These projects are valuable to 
Ethiopians while also affording Chinese SOEs valuable contracts and employing thousands 
of Chinese citizens. 
As in many other African states, Chinese companies are active in developing road 
infrastructure. According to Cabestan, the Chinese are currently building approximately 
80% of Ethiopian roads.267 A Chinese company is also responsible for the Addis Ababa 
Ring Road, a conspicuous vanity project in Ethiopia’s capital.268 Shinn attributes Chinese 
companies’ competitiveness in the bidding process to government soft loans that 
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specifically benefit Chinese state owned or private companies. Such practices do not 
directly affect the United States, who rarely participates in the sector, but have 
disadvantaged American allies Japan and South Korea, who have been unable to 
successfully bid for infrastructure development projects.269 
Chinese companies have also been instrumental in Ethiopian efforts to increase 
power generation and distribution capability, primarily through hydroelectric dams. 46% 
of Chinese development assistance is directed to energy supply and generation projects.270 
Such projects include dams, wind turbines, and power lines. In absolute terms, this means 
that China has devoted $1.66 billion towards Ethiopian energy projects between 2000 and 
2012. According to Chakrabarty, China’s Export-Import Bank funds five of Ethiopia’s 
10 current energy generation and supply projects.271 Even in the cases where the  
Export-Import Bank has not funded the energy projects, Chinese companies are the 
implementers.272 China differentiates itself in these projects through its no-questions-
asked approach. It funds and carries out these projects despite widespread environmental, 
humanitarian, and political criticism.273  
Large Chinese telecommunications firms have found unequaled access to that 
sector in Ethiopia. Some important projects in this sector include widening access to mobile 
telephones, expanding internet connectivity, and upgrading or generally improving 
existing telecommunications infrastructure. The Chinese telecommunications company 
Huawei, recently benefited from a Chinese loan to Ethiopia, worth $834 million.274  
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Similar to other loan-backed projects, this telecommunications deal is expected to allow 
Huawei to “edge out competitors.”275  
Moreover, the ZTE Corporation has already cornered the sector for over a decade, 
mainly as a result of the Ethiopian government’s stranglehold on it, via the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation.276 It is likely that the relationship with the ZTE 
Corporation has also facilitated authoritarian actions by the Ethiopian regime. The 
government’s efforts to monitor and track dissidents, block signals from Voice of America 
and Deutsche Welle, and cut off access to cellular, internet, and messaging services 
requires the sophisticated technical capacity provided by the Chinese.277  
Despite these benefits to the regime, the low quality of the infrastructure has 
prompted the Ethiopian government to seek outside assessment, helping the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation devise better regulations and project requirements. Such 
interaction demonstrates the Ethiopian government’s commitment to pragmatism but 
should not be seen as Ethiopia snubbing Chinese investment. It is likely that, in the near 
term, Chinese influence in the telecommunications sector will remain considerable, due to 
Chinese government assistance to Chinese companies and the long-term relationship 
between the Ethiopian government and companies such as Huawei and ZTE.  
China has been extremely successfully at achieving its economic goals in Ethiopia, 
as a direct result of its efforts in the infrastructure sector. Chinese SOEs and private 
enterprises successfully leverage their technical expertise, regional experience, and 
exceptional supply chain to accumulate Ethiopia’s largest contracts. In many cases these 
contracts are funded by the Chinese government itself, which further supports Chinese 
companies’ bids. These costly projects provide the backbone of the Sino-Ethiopian 
diplomatic relationship. As Nantulya argues, Chinese infrastructure projects are embraced 
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by African leaders, who view such cooperation as a demonstration that they are considered 
equals at the table.278 
While Chinese infrastructure projects are widely welcomed, there are two main 
areas that diminish their effectiveness at enhancing China’s influence and achieving its 
foreign policy objectives. The first is China’s preference for using Chinese labor and 
companies, while the second is perceptions of poor-quality Chinese products flooding the 
Ethiopian market. Neither complaint drastically reduces Chinese attractiveness in the 
economic sector, but both demonstrate the potential pitfalls of widespread economic 
interaction, especially when the economic balance is so skewed.  
Chinese enterprises are often the only companies allowed to bid on projects and, in 
most cases, Chinese labor is favored or used exclusively. Cabestan argues that, as of 2012, 
Chinese laborers in Ethiopia totaled at least 100,000.279 The majority of these laborers are 
working on the Chinese infrastructure projects. This high number of outside laborers 
frustrates locally under or unemployed Ethiopians. China has yet to modify its practices in 
Ethiopia to address these criticisms. Nonetheless, Chinese investment is still deemed 
worthwhile by most Ethiopians, especially the political elite.  
Another common criticism of China’s economic influence in Africa pertains to the 
quality and scope of Chinese products saturating local markets. In Ethiopia this criticism 
applies to activities at all levels, from consumer items to large infrastructure projects.280 
Former PM Meles famously dismissed such criticism of Chinese goods, stating that the 
“price is good. The bulk is good. So, they compete with other foreign goods, and they 
compete with domestic goods as well. Who wins the competition? It is the product.”281 
Nonetheless, the literature reflects that all elements of Ethiopian society have been at least 
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occasionally dissatisfied with Chinese products and projects. A perception of low-quality 
products diminishes China’s influence in Ethiopia and the region. Cheap prices will still 
make Chinese products popular, but consumers at all levels may still prefer the more 
expensive quality goods from other suppliers. However, it is likely that the Chinese 
products may edge out competitors with their low prices, eventually becoming the only 
option for some products.  
2. Economic Cooperation 
China sees in Ethiopia immense market potential, and a China-like state structure 
amenable to Chinese investment. Both states depend on robust SOEs and expend strong 
central economic control. Ethiopia, with its singular devotion to economic development, 
sees China as an example to be emulated and as a potential market.282 However, bilateral 
trade heavily favors China, which has been a source of consternation amongst the Ethiopian 
elite.283 This trade deficit, though perhaps expected, has prompted Ethiopian state 
involvement, including requesting the Chinese expand duty-free imports for certain 
Ethiopian products.  
Though Ethiopian-Chinese trade typically favors China, a growing Chinese market 
for sesame seeds has propelled that industry in Ethiopia. That product, Ethiopia’s primary 
export to China, has seen dramatic growth since 2004.284 Sesame is now one fifth of 
Ethiopia’s total exports, at the expense of coffee whose share of Ethiopian exports dropped 
to one third.285 Such a shift demonstrates the confluence of interest and capability between 
the two states. This move satisfies Chinese demands for increased sesame, which has 
grown due to a domestic decline in production. Furthermore, it creates the perception that 
both states can benefit from bilateral trade, which reduces tensions over the states’ overall 
trade deficit. China has also attempted to reduce these tensions by enlarging its list of 
                                                 
282 Elsje Fourie, “China’s Example for Meles’ Ethiopia: When Development ‘Models’ Land*,” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 3 (September 2015): 311, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X15000397. 
283 Shinn, “Ethiopia and China,” 156. 
284 Chakrabarty, “Ethiopia–China Economic Relations,” 231. 
285 Chakrabarty, 231. 
89 
eligible Ethiopian duty-free items.286 The aim of such preferential treatment was to aid 
Ethiopian products on the Chinese market. However, while this trade agreement is an 
improvement from the Ethiopian perspective, it is unlikely to substantially reduce the trade 
imbalance.  
China has also encouraged the Ethiopian government to create a special economic 
zone, a tool that China itself historically used to generate considerable foreign direct 
investment.287 These zones are delineated geographic areas targeted to generate foreign 
investment through advantageous tax incentives and ready-built infrastructure. The 
Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Zone, located a short distance from Addis Ababa, was financed 
by the Chinese Export-Import Bank and private Chinese companies and was constructed 
by several Chinese firms.288 As of 2012, despite being open for business to any investors, 
only Chinese businesses had invested.289 As Hanauer and Morris contend, while the 
special economic zone benefits some Ethiopians, it also provides relief to Chinese 
businesses looking to relocate offshore.290 While the Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Zone is 
only one data point, its existence demonstrates Ethiopian openness to Chinese investment, 
and more importantly, development strategies.  
Despite the normally cordial relationship, the Ethiopian government has also 
pushed back in some trade disputes. One such occasion saw Ethiopian authorities return 
$13 million of Huawei telecommunications equipment, which had been imported without 
approval.291 Such push back indicates that sovereignty still matters to the Ethiopian 
government, even in the economic sector.  
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D. UNCONVENTIONAL INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES 
In the following section I will consider efforts in unconventional sectors, in terms 
of typical Chinese influence activities. Forays into military cooperation and development 
assistance display China’s emerging tactics in unconventional sectors. These activities are 
uncharted territory for the Chinese, but well-worn for many Western states, especially the 
United States. These programs are limited in scope and effectiveness, yet their existence 
demonstrates adaptive thinking by the Chinese government.  
1. Military 
Chinese military engagement in Ethiopia exists but is limited. Such interaction is 
welcome in Ethiopia, despite Chinese military support to Eritrea during the Ethiopia–
Eritrea border war that concluded in 2000.292 China in fact supplied both sides of the 
conflict, with total arms sales of $1 billion, despite a UN arms embargo.293 Currently, the 
Chinese supply artillery and some light troop vehicles to the ENDF.294  Ethiopia is likely 
to continue to seek arms from China, as they are largely compatible with their current 
equipment and available. 
Shinn highlights another rare aspect of the Chinese relationship with Ethiopia. The 
Chinese embassy maintains a military attaché in Ethiopia, unlike at most of its African 
stations. Funding such a posting indicates China’s dedication to maintaining a strong 
bilateral military relationship. Furthermore, the Chinese security services conduct military 
exchange visits and train a few Ethiopian officers.295 Nonetheless, China’s military 
influence in Ethiopia is limited and is likely to remain so in the near-term. 
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In terms of accomplishing Chinese goals in Ethiopia, its military cooperation 
programs are moderately effective. At one level, participating in military exchanges, and 
hosting Ethiopian forces for training demonstrates willingness and commitment to a long-
term relationship. China’s arms sales are likely a function of convenience and economic 
opportunity. Chinese weapons could be used by the ENDF to maintain law and order within 
its borders, which is in China’s interest. Thus, despite China’s moderate level of military 
cooperation in Ethiopia, the PRC is unlikely to become Ethiopia’s security partner of 
choice in the near term. Its military cooperation is more likely to facilitate diplomatic goals 
and open the door for expanded programs in the future.  
2. Development Assistance 
China’s expansion in this sector is limited and experimental. To put their efforts 
into perspective, in 2006, China’s aid only amounted to 0.14 percent of aid received by 
Ethiopia.296 Data on the projects are limited, though Cabestan specifically mentions the 
agricultural and medical sectors.297 However, Chinese forays in the humanitarian 
assistance and aid sectors reflects a greater understanding of Ethiopian needs and desires, 
and a willingness to employ new tactics to improve the bilateral relationship.  
China has also used Ethiopia to introduce new soft power programs in the 
humanitarian assistance sector. In one such case, China’s nascent equivalent of the U.S. 
Peace Corps sent 12 volunteers to Ethiopia, in its first foray into Africa. These activities 
do not currently threaten the equivalent Western programs. However, the United States 
must recognize that as “emerging donors” increase their assistance, Western conditionality 
and intrusions to sovereignty will become less tenable long-term practices.298 Chinese 
assistance is likely to grow, especially if Chinese domestic growth remains consistent. 
However, I do not expect this assistance level to approach or match large budget Western 
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aid levels in Ethiopia in the near-term. Cabestan suggests Chinese development assistance 
is more akin to medium donors, such as Canada and Italy.299 
China’s new emphasis on development assistance is largely an ineffective element 
of its overall influence campaign. As indicated by the program’s extremely limited budget, 
this may be by design. China still considers infrastructure projects as the programs most 
effective at accomplishing its goals but may use development assistance to counter 
common perceptions that see those infrastructure projects as predatory. By demonstrating 
Chinese generosity, the regime hopes to reinforce perceptions that the Chinese model can 
be admired, if not emulated. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite the confluence of interest between China and Ethiopia, some of China’s 
actions draw criticism. These challenges should be considered setbacks and lessons learned 
and should not be over-emphasized. The Sino-Ethiopian relationship is strong and will 
likely remain so for the foreseeable future. The states have found a way to achieve some 
of their own goals by cooperating. Ethiopia receives highly desired investment. China gains 
a positive reputation, broadens its diplomatic alliances, and relieves some domestic labor 
pressures.300 Furthermore, Ethiopia sees developmental lessons in the Chinese 
experiences, and thus emulates certain Chinese policies. Thus, Ethiopia values China’s 
expert power, meaning it values the technical expertise China demonstrates and hopes to 
develop a similar system. Moreover, during periods of heightened authoritarianism, 
Ethiopia depends on investment and cooperation from an understanding China. In these 
periods, the perceived limitations of Western assistance become more evident, highlighting 
the attractiveness of the “Chinese model.” Cabestan highlights the results of Ethiopia’s 
2005 crackdown on political opposition, where the EU provisionally suspended aid.301 
Such a reduction was mostly symbolic, but nonetheless provided China with an opportunity 
to be seen as a reliable “non-interference” partner. Chinese influence in Ethiopia is mostly 
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distinct from typical American projects. While some new methods have wandered into 
traditional U.S. influence activities, the limited nature of these projects makes them more 
curious than concerning. 
The United States must recognize the attractiveness of China’s efforts in Ethiopia, 
rather than dismiss them as predatory. Furthermore, where it wishes to compete it should 
identify and value its strong areas, such as the quality of its products and embrace of 
Ethiopian labor and enterprise. In some sectors, such as large infrastructure projects, the 
United States will not be able to compete with Chinese influence. In such cases, the United 
States must acknowledge that such investment can contribute towards the stability, security 
and prosperity of the Ethiopian people, which is its main objective in Ethiopia. 
Furthermore, criticizing Sino-Ethiopian cooperation without offering reasonable 
alternatives stands to antagonize the Ethiopian government.  
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A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This thesis addressed the impact and effectiveness of U.S. influence in Ethiopia. To 
do so, I analyzed the state of current internal levers of power within the Ethiopian state. I 
concluded that the EPRDF and Executive Branch are most important, but that those levers 
are vulnerable to both domestic and international pressure. Furthermore, the very 
composition and nature of the EPRDF coalition is shifting, the results of which have yet to 
fully develop. Next, I considered the main goals of the United States in Ethiopia. I then 
considered its efforts in its three most active areas of influence: SSA, economic 
cooperation, and SHD. Finally, I investigated China’s primary interests in Ethiopia. I 
followed up by analyzing Chinese influence activities and their effectiveness. While 
China’s methods conform to its conventional expertise, notably large-scale infrastructure 
projects and economic partnership, I found that China has explored influence activities 
more typically associated with western powers. 
I employed an analytic approach that focused on four primary components. First, 
state interest clarified the objectives of both the IA and target states, explicitly delineating 
their individual or mutual interests. Levers of power emphasized the diverse set of actors 
which shape the trajectory and actions of the Ethiopian state. Influence activities identified 
which influence activities the IAs used in Ethiopia. Finally, influence analysis considered 
the effectiveness of these activities in developing overall influence.  
The United States should be confident that its influence activities and continued 
engagement with Ethiopia have allowed it to exert influence. Ethiopian agency, and a 
historical commitment to sovereignty, has at times limited American influence. However, 
the same notions of sovereignty and commitment to Ethiopian interests has similarly 
affected all foreign governments. Furthermore, shifting political dynamics means that the 
United States is best poised to create connections with a wider range of Ethiopian actors. 
In this effort, the United States’ broad portfolio of influence activities allows it greater 
flexibility to assess newly empowered Ethiopian levers of power and target them 
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accordingly. China’s emphasis on developmental projects has created a strong shared 
economic interest. This mutual interest has prompted Ethiopia to support China’s 
diplomatic goals, one of China’s key policy objectives. However, China’s almost exclusive 
emphasis on infrastructure and economic partnerships decreases its opportunities to 
capitalize on Ethiopian political developments.  
B. SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
1. Targeting Levers of Power 
During my analysis of Ethiopia’s internal power levers, I discovered that the 
foundations that led to EPRDF regime longevity are showing signs of dramatic change. 
Key elements of EPRDF power are beginning to shift. In particular, the change from the 
TPLF being the core of the party especially has significant long-term implications. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by PM Abiy’s appointment after a long period of civil unrest, 
the Ethiopian people have the capacity to change and influence their government. They 
currently tolerate the EPRDF because it still maintains the broadest political base, across 
many of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups. Whether intentional or not, the EPRDF’s pursuit of 
ethnic federalism fostered an environment where every subsequent political party would 
be based on a single ethnic group. Only the widespread 2018 protests saw opposition 
parties from different ethnic groups coalesce, and even in that case such cooperation was 
limited. Nonetheless, until opposition groups widen their appeal and broaden their 
membership, the EPRDF will likely remain the primary political force in the country. Even 
the TPLF’s departure, painful as it might be, will not erode overall EPRDF electoral 
success.  
Policy implication 
This information suggests that the United States should continue to support 
influence activities that empower everyday Ethiopians. American influence has typically 
solidified the ties between the U.S.G. and the executive and military, but programs that 
target everyday Ethiopians might yield successful results in the future. Nonetheless, despite 
cracks within the formerly invincible EPRDF, its politically primacy should not be 
underestimated. The EPRDF will likely remain in power through the 2020 parliamentary 
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elections, but we should expect continued and occasionally severe civil disturbances (or 
other outbursts such as the Amhara regional coup) in the electoral run-up. PM Abiy’s 
reforms have fostered a much-needed space for political debate and have reduced the 
government’s worst repressive tendencies. These measures could be reversed if the EPRDF 
decides regime survival is at stake. However, the United States could reinforce the positive 
steps the Abiy regime has pursued by tying reforms to expanded economic and 
development assistance.  
2. Influencing Ethiopia’s Regional Security Role 
While assessing U.S. influence in Ethiopia, the state’s commitment to developing 
regional security was immediately evident. Ethiopia consistently demonstrates a desire to 
secure its own neighborhood and maintain a professionally competent and advanced 
military. Its government would likely pursue action in the region (Somalia and South 
Sudan) with or without the support of external actors. Only significant domestic upheavals 
have compelled Ethiopian security forces withdrawals from regional peacekeeping efforts. 
Despite its internal motivation for regional stability, the Ethiopian government does 
appreciate the expanded capabilities and effectiveness derived from security assistance 
programs, especially from the United States. Ethiopia also highly values its sovereignty.  
Policy Implication 
The United States should realize that it can do little to compel the Ethiopian 
government to participate in a regional PKOs. The United States should format requests 
and consider security actions based on the understanding that maintaining sovereignty is a 
critical component of Ethiopia’s agenda. Despite this limitation, Ethiopian and American 
security interests have trended similarly over the last 15 years. Where there are areas of 
mutual interest, such as CT in Somalia and PKO in South Sudan, the United States should 
identify limitations of the ENDF and work together with the Ethiopian government to 
develop solutions. In some cases, this may mean transferring American equipment, and in 
others it might mean bilateral training. Nonetheless, the United States must understand that 
cooperation will only be accepted where it benefits the Ethiopian government. At a 
symbolic level, the United States should structure its dialogue in ways that convince the 
98 
Ethiopian government that they are a valued partner that deserves an equal seat at the table. 
Even with a strong and positive relationship, the Ethiopian government will not give the 
United States carte blanche to operate as it wishes within Ethiopian territory.  
3. Foreign Influence and Ethiopia’s Economic Development 
Ethiopian leaders have derived continued legitimacy by sustaining remarkable 
economic growth and development. American efforts to obtain influence by supporting 
Ethiopia economically are less effective than their Chinese equivalents. Though the U.S.G. 
understands the Ethiopian government’s focus on growth, the economic tools with which 
it operates are less direct than China’s. China’s expansion of Ethiopian duty-free exports 
illustrates that it both understood Ethiopia’s concerns and was willing to address them. 
Ethiopia sees Chinese infrastructure projects as vital to achieving its ambitious economic 
objectives. The Chinese government leverages its unique infrastructure expertise, supply 
networks, and frequent loans to ensure China is the infrastructure partner of choice. As 
long as the Ethiopian government sees mutual benefit, as it does with many Chinese 
initiatives, it will continue to court Chinese investment. 
Policy Implication 
Despite indications of domestic dissatisfaction with Chinese projects, the Ethiopian 
government will continue to welcome Chinese investment. The United States must 
understand Ethiopia’s pragmatic approach to this situation. Should any state display the 
same level of interest and investment as China, it would be welcomed enthusiastically. 
Realistically, the United States will not attempt to compete with China in the expensive 
large-scale infrastructure projects that garner Ethiopian regime prestige. Any U.S. 
complaints directed at the Ethiopian government for accepting Chinese assistance are likely 
to fall upon deaf ears. U.S. efforts, alongside its western allies, especially in the SHD 
sector, are very well received and demonstrate those state’s commitment to the Ethiopian 
people. 
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4. China’s Expansion of Influence Activities 
Within the last 15 years, China has tentatively expanded its influence activity 
portfolio. The scale of this expansion indicates such activities are best considered 
experimental. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian government has willingly welcomed such 
activities. Though these activities are nonconventional for the Chinese, they have 
prominently featured in Western engagement. They could allow China an opportunity to 
provide an alternative to Western assistance and conditionality. However, China’s tepid 
acceptance of these new sectors undermines any potential benefits. 
Policy Implication 
The United States should monitor the scale and effectiveness of nonconventional 
Chinese influence activities. American activities’ longevity should not be seen as 
immutable influence. Instead, the United States could learn from Chinese attempts and 
determine the limitations and possibilities of Chinese activities. 
C. GAPS IN RESEARCH AND AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
My research indicated that far more scholarship has been devoted to China’s 
influence in Ethiopia than to western states’ influence, including the United States. General 
Sino-pessimism, as well as China’s rapid onslaught of African engagement is responsible 
for the ample scholarship on Chinese influence. Meanwhile, it is unclear why data 
gathering for U.S. activity was so difficult. Unlike for Chinese influence studies, no single 
text provided a comprehensive review of most American programs. Though I have 
gathered information on some of the U.S.’ activities, the field would benefit from a more 
thorough examination.   
Another area that demands further investigation is China’s use of unconventional 
influence activities in Ethiopia. Unfortunately, most of the data I used for my study of this 
phenomenon was limited to 2014 and earlier. A greater understanding of these programs’ 
specific objectives and results could help explain and predict China’s future regional 
strategies.  
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Finally, academic literature trails current political trends within the EPRDF, 
especially the TPLF’s decision to withdraw from the wider organization. Such a discussion 
is needed because scholarly agreement consistently emphasized the importance of that 
bloc’s influence. It is unclear whether the TPLF’s departure will mean another party will 
assume a primary role, such as Abiy’s ODP, or if the EPRDF will radically transform. 
Thus, focused attention on this topic could contribute to an improved understanding of the 
future nature and structure of the EPRDF.  
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